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The Natures of Nation: State-building and the Politics of Environmental 
Marginality in 19th and 20th Century Southern France 
 
by 
Samuel S. Temple 
 
 
Chair: Joshua H. Cole 
 
This dissertation argues that efforts to identify, improve, and, at times, 
preserve “marginal” environments such as moor, marshlands and alpine slopes 
both contributed to and complicated the broader process of state-building in 
modern France. It employs the concept of environmental marginality, defined 
broadly as a set of unequal but mutable economic, political and cultural relations 
between the French state and rural communities, to demonstrate how 
environmental claims forwarded and frustrated state power. In particular, it 
highlights the role of discourses of degradation, risk and the public good in the 
ongoing negotiation between the French state and rural peripheries over the 
proper use and allocation of natural resources.  
 
 x 
Three case studies frame the geographical and temporal scope of this 
dissertation: the creation and management of pine forests in the Landes de 
Gascogne south of Bordeaux; the reclamation and hydraulic engineering of the 
Camargue, delta of the Rhone river; and the alpine restoration campaign in the 
southern Alps and Pyrenees. I argue that these projects of environmental 
engineering, initiated by the Second Empire and extended by the Third Republic, 
reflected a shift in attitudes towards national territory, from a given set of 
geographical boundaries defined by sovereignty to a space of rationalization and 
improvement. Distinct in scale, scope and objectives, all three projects sought 
the same end: to govern nature in a way that best served the agricultural, 
commercial and industrial needs of the nation.  
At the same time, the dissertation demonstrates how environmental 
marginality tested the limits and coherence of state power. Marginal landscapes, 
I contend, did not easily submit to the demands of modernization and state-
building. Rather, they proved to be stubborn sites of contestation and creative 
appropriation, where the conventional boundaries between state and society blur. 
Rural and urban groups alike vied with both the state and one another for control 
over the material resources and cultural meaning of local environments. 
Environmental marginality, this dissertation concludes, was not merely a useful 
fiction of administrative control but rather an ongoing dialogue of national 
belonging that emerged at the interstices of state, society and nature. 
 
 1 
Chapter One  Introduction 
 
Today, marginal environments compose the vast majority of protected 
lands in France. Marshes, mountains, deltas and coastlines draw a mix of nature 
lovers, tourists and outdoor enthusiasts. National and regional parks, wildlife 
refuges and “eco-museums” have rendered these environments into privileged 
spaces of both nature protection and cultural preservation. Prior to the 20th 
century, however, these landscapes were considered the bane of civilization. 
Considered unproductive, unhealthy and catastrophic, marginal lands were 
something to conquer and transform, not preserve.  
Generally overlooked by French historians, the problem of marginal 
environments nevertheless offer a unique window onto the history of modern 
France. This dissertation argues that efforts to identify, improve, and, at times, 
preserve “marginal” environments such as moors, marshlands and alpine slopes 
both contributed to and complicated the broader process of state-building that 
profoundly shaped the lives and landscapes of French men and women. It 
employs the concept of environmental marginality, defined broadly as a set of 
unequal but mutable economic, political and cultural relations between the 
French state and rural communities, to demonstrate how environmental claims 
forwarded and frustrated state power in modern France. In particular, it highlights 
the role of discourses of degradation, risk and the public good in the ongoing 
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negotiation between the French state and rural peripheries over the proper use 
and allocation of natural resources.  
Three case studies frame the geographical and temporal scope of this 
dissertation: the creation and management of pine forests in the Landes de 
Gascogne south of Bordeaux; the reclamation and hydraulic engineering of the 
Camargue, delta of the Rhone river; and the alpine restoration campaign in the 
southern Alps and Pyrenees. I argue that these projects of environmental 
engineering, initiated by the Second Empire and extended by the Third Republic, 
reflected a shift in attitudes towards national territory, from a given set of 
geographical boundaries defined by sovereignty to a space of rationalization and 
improvement. Distinct in scale, scope and objectives, all three projects sought 
the same end: to govern nature in a way that best served the agricultural, 
commercial and industrial needs of the nation. Through techniques of property 
reform, hydraulic engineering, reforestation and flood control, the French state 
attempted to integrate these marginal regions and their inhabitants into the 
market economy and national polity. Whether cast in productivist, hygienic or 
catastrophic terms, environmental marginality became a key mode through which 
the French state sought to extend its control over both resources and population 
At the same time, the dissertation demonstrates how the problem of 
environmental marginality tested the limits and coherence of state power. 
Marginal landscapes, I contend, did not easily submit to the demands of 
modernization and state-building. Rather, they proved to be stubborn sites of 
contestation and creative appropriation, where the conventional boundaries 
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between state and society blur. Territorial improvement schemes hatched in 
engineering reports and legislative debate became fragmented through the 
prisms of proliferating claims.  Rural and urban groups alike vied with both the 
state and one another for control over the material resources and cultural 
meaning of local environments. Landowning elites, poor peasants, forest 
workers, tourists, regionalists, conservationists and industrialists both forwarded 
and frustrated state efforts to transform national territory and define national 
belonging. Environmental marginality, this dissertation concludes, was not merely 
a useful fiction of administrative control but rather an ongoing dialogue of national 
belonging that emerged at the interstices of state, society and nature.  
 
The Environment in French History 
 
In studying how environmental marginality became incorporated into both 
political imaginaries and territorial policies of modern France, this dissertation 
contributes to the growing field of French and, more broadly, European 
environmental history. Since its emergence in the 1970s as a distinct field of 
historical inquiry in the United States, environmental history has matured and 
diversified, enriched by different national and global perspectives. While 
American scholarship occupied a dominant position early on, particularly in its 
focus on wilderness and conservation, the field has evolved along different paths 
in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America where, in general terms, there has 
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been a greater emphasis on peasant societies, state-building and colonialism.1 A 
dizzying array of topics, theoretical approaches and methodologies now 
comprise what counts as environmental history. Alongside more established 
currents of forest, agricultural and conservation history one finds new 
approaches to imperialism, industrial and urban pollution, consumption, gender 
and race relations, technological and scientific development and natural 
disasters.2  
French environmental history has, until recently, been a minor 
contributor to the larger field. This is not say that the environment is absent from 
French narratives of historical change. Quite the opposite. French historians 
have long been interested in the relations between society and nature. The 
Annales school, identified by some as a key precursor to American 
environmental history, focused on the long durée of historical change, forging a 
close relationship between rural history and geography while at the same time 
attempting to bridge the growing divergence between the natural and human 
“sciences.”3 Succeeding generations of rural and agricultural historians, historical 
geographers, sociologists and forest historians, among others, have produced a 
                                                
1 For critiques of the exceptionalist and provincial tendencies of the American field, see 
Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third-
World Critique," Environmental Ethics 11 (Spring 1989): 71–83 and Richard Grove, “Editorial,” 
Environment and History 1: 1 (1995). 
2 For recent attempts at diagnostic overviews, see Alfred W. Crosby, “The Past and Present of 
Environmental History,” American Historical Review 100, no. 4 (October 1995): 1177–89; J. R. 
McNeill, “Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History,” History and Theory 
42, no. 4 (2003): 5–43; Sverker Sorlin and Paul Warde, “The Problem of the Problem of 
Environmental History: A Re-reading of the Field,” Environmental History 12 (January 2007): 107-
30; and Joachim Radku, Nature and Power: A global history of the environment, trans. Thomas 
Dunlap (Washington, D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
3 For contrasting interpretations of the importance of Annales scholarship to American 
environmental history, see Crosby, “The Past and Present of Environmental History” and G. 
Massard-Guilbaud, “Quelle histoire pour l’environnement?”, Annales des Mines 48 (2007), 30-37. 
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rich and diverse scholarship on the changing relations between environment and 
society in France. 4 Yet, as some have suggested, it is precisely this plurality of 
approaches and disciplinary agendas that has dampened the development of a 
distinct field of environmental history with an identifiable set of methodological 
and theoretical practices.5 Over the past decade, there has been a noticeable 
effort to consolidate the various strands of scholarship on the environmental. 6 
 Three broad tendencies have characterized historical research on the 
environment in France. First, cultivated and human landscapes take precedence 
of over wild nature. In contrast to American concerns with wilderness and 
conservation, French approaches have tended to focus on the agricultural and 
symbolic uses to which nature is put. As Caroline Ford and Tamara Whited 
observe, French historians have shown little interest in the “autonomous forces of 
a wild nature” that remain an important, if problematic, pole in American 
environmental history.7 Indeed, in its rejection of a strict division between nature 
and culture in favor of more relational and hybrid conception of “social” nature, 
                                                
4 For recent assessments of French contributions to European environmental history, see 
Caroline Ford, “Nature’s Fortunes: New Directions in the Writing of European Environmental 
History,” Journal of Modern History 79 (March 2007): 112-133; Ford and Tamara Whited, 
“Introduction,” in the special issue  “New Directions in French Environmental History,” French 
Historical Studies 32: 3 (2009); Michael Bess, Mark Cioc, James Sievert, “Environmental history 
writing in southern Europe,” Environmental History 5: 4 (2000); and Fabien Locher and Grégory 
Quenet, “L'histoire environnementale : origines, enjeux et perspectives d'un nouveau chantier,” 
Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 56: 4 (2009):7-38. 
5 Fabien Locher and Grégory Quenet, “L'histoire environnementale,” 19-21. 
6 For instance, the Réseau Universitaire de Chercheurs en Histoire Environnementale or RUCHE 
was established 2008 and the first summer school of the European Society for Environmental 
History was held in Saint-Rémy-les-Chevreuse, France in 2010.  
7 Ford and Tamara Whited, “Introduction,” 345; Ford, “Landscape and Environment in French 
Historical and Geographical Thought: New Directions,” French Historical Studies 24 (2001): 125–
34. For one of the foundational texts of the “wilderness debate” in American history, see William 
Cronon, “The Problem With The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” 
in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90. 
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French scholarship has in many ways anticipated the more recent “cultural” turn 
in environmental history in the United States.8 
Another characteristic of historical approaches to the environment in 
France is the pervasive presence of the state. Institutions like the Ponts-et-
Chaussées and Eaux-et-Forets played an important role in both the cataloging 
and reshaping of national territory and their frequent conflicts with agrarian local 
populations over resource management have been a major focus of rural and 
forest history. Sociologists and geographers have contributed to state-centered 
approaches through their critiques of technocratic representations of nature as 
an instrument to elide local claims to land and resources.9 As Gregory Quenet 
and Fabian Locher note, even the term environnement is tainted with a statist 
cast, emerging not from ecological activism as in the United States but postwar 
technocratic planning and the establishment of the Ministry for the Protection of 
Nature and the Environment in 1971. 10 
 Finally, French historical perspectives on the environment reflect how 
ideals of technological modernity have shaped attitudes towards nature and 
territory since the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment promoted a vision of 
nature as the raw material of human ingenuity and improvement. In the 
                                                
8 Richard White, “From Wilderness to Hybrid Landscapes: The cultural turn in environmental 
history,” The Historian 66 (2004): 559. 
9 J.L. Fabiani, “La nature, l'action publique, et la régulation sociale. Du rural à l'environnement,” in 
La question de la nature aujourd'hui, eds. N. Mathieu and M. Jollivet (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), 
195-208; B. Kalaora, Au-delà de la nature l'environnement: l'observation sociale de 
l'environnement (Paris: L'Hartmattan, 1998); Y. Luginbuhl, “Nature, paysage, environnement,” in 
Du milieu à l’environnement: practiques et représentations du rapport homme-nature depuis la 
Renaissance (Paris: Economica, 1992). 
10 They speculate this is one reason environmental history as a distinct field has been met with 
some suspicion among French scholars. Fabien Locher and Grégory Quenet, “L'histoire 
environnementale,” 18. For the earlier use of environnement among academic geographers, see 
P. Matagne, “L'Homme et l'environnement,” in Les sources de l'histoire de l'environnement: Le 
XIXe siècle, ed. A. Corvol (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), 73. 
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nineteenth century, doctrines of circulation and technological modernity, inspired 
in large part by followers of Saint-Simon, shaped ideals of national territory. In 
the twentieth century, postwar anxieties over the disappearance of rural 
landscapes at home and loss of resource-rich colonies abroad were balanced by 
faith in “frantic modernization”: supersonic Concordes, high-speed trains 
and nuclear reactors heralded a new national identity centered around 
technological modernity.11 
An analysis of marginal environments both contributes to and complicates 
these historical themes of cultivated landscapes, state institutions and 
technocratic visions. First, it suggests that uncultivated regions, by representing 
the antithesis of well-used nature, played an important role in the ways the 
French both imagined and managed their national territory.  Second, it reveals 
how, while the state was an important actor in environmental transformation, a 
host of other groups contributed to the remaking of nature in France. Finally, it 
points to the ways that the environmental constraints of, as well as competing 
                                                
11 The general technocratic influence over environmental ideas is noted in Michael Bess, Mark 
Cioc, James Sievert, “Environmental history writing in southern Europe,” Environmental History 5: 
4 (2000): 545. For an account of Enlightenment connections between environment and ideals of 
technological control, see Rosalind Williams, “Nature Out of Control: Cultural Origins and 
Environmental Implications of Large Technological Systems,” in Cultures of Control, ed. Miriam 
Levin (London: Routledge, 1996), 42-43. The role of Saint-simonianism in how nineteenth century 
elites envisioned national territory and the appropriate uses of nature is treated in Antoine Picon, 
Les Saint-Simoniens: Raison, imaginaire et utopie (Paris: Belin, 2002) and Jean-Luc Mayaud, “Le 
Second Empire: faîte économique ou épisode négligeable?” in Pourquoi rehabiliter le Second 
Empire?, ed. Maurice Agulhon (Paris: B. Giovanangeli, 1997), 105-116. For postwar accounts of 
technological modernity and its important in reframing national identity, see Michael Bess, Light 
Green Society: Ecology and technological modernity in France, 1960-2000 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2003); Gabrielle Hecht, The radiance of France : nuclear power and national 
identity after World War II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); and Sara B. Pritchard, “Reconstructing 
the Rhone: The Cultural Politics of Nature and Nation in Contemporary France, 1945-1997,” 
French Historical Studies 27: 4 (2004), 765-799. 
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claims over, marginal regions both provoked and resisted efforts of technological 
mastery. 
  
Nature and Nation-building in France: The politics of environmental 
marginality  
  
The second half of the nineteenth century in France marked an era of 
unprecedented state intervention into the environment. Scripted under the 
Second Empire and extended by the Third Republic, a new politics of territory, or 
aménagement du territoire, emerged as an essential component of national 
unification. Along with the familiar projects of road, canal, and rail construction 
that sought to integrate national markets, lesser-known efforts of reclamation, 
irrigation, and reforestation aimed to  “improve”  lands  deemed  ruined,  sterile,  
insalubrious and even catastrophic. While foresters were dispatched to an alpine 
periphery ravaged by deforestation, erosion and flooding, engineers made their 
way to barren plains and fetid marshlands. 12  
In studying the social and political construction of environmental 
marginality, this dissertation adds a new perspective to the well-known processes 
of modernization and nation-building charted by French historians. As elsewhere 
in Europe, nineteenth century France witnessed the growing insinuation of the 
state into lives and landscapes. Beginning with the dissolution of intermediary 
seignorial and ecclesiastic privilege following the Revolution, state practices and 
institutions steadily expanded into rural France. Customary and local practices 
                                                
12  For a brief overview of some of these projects, see Louis Girard, La politique des Travaux 
publics du Second Empire (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952), 230-237. 
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became increasingly overlaid with bureaucratic forms and institutions: the 
creation of new territorial units in the form of departments and communes; the 
rationalization of custom and tax collection; the spread of judicial courts; and the 
extension of property reform, military conscription and education to rural 
regions.13 
In his 1976 classic, Peasants into Frenchmen, Eugen Weber provided a 
compelling interpretation of how this process of  “statification” forged the modern 
French nation. Weber showed how, in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the spreading tendrils of state infrastructure and institutions such roads, rails, 
schools and military conscription helped unite the previously disparate and 
culturally distinct regions of France. While none of this was news to most rural 
historians, Weber managed to craft a narrative that appealed to both specialists 
and generalists, inside and outside of French history. Eschewing for the most 
part elite discourses and ideologies, Weber focused on the ways the prosaic 
functions and technologies of the state itself was crucial in forging national 
identity.  Transportation, market economies, mandatory schooling and military 
service, rather than political discourse, were what really transformed peasants 
into Frenchmen.14   
                                                
13 Isser Woloch, The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789-1820s (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), 34; Lutz Raphael, “ L’Etat dans les villages,” in Histoire de 
l’Europe rurale contemporaine, Du Village à L'Etat , ed. Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger (Paris: A. Colin, 
2006), 250-1. 
14 Laird Boswell, “Rethinking the Nation at the Periphery,” French Politics, Culture & Society 27.2 
(2009): 113. Geoff Eley echoes this point, noting that in England and France national identity 
emerged less from intellectual forms than through the institutions of state-formation, such as 
parliamentary government, a national press and reading “public”, compulsory education, and 
public works. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Introduction,” in Becoming National: a Reader, 
eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 8-9. 
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Weber’s basic thesis provoked a generation of scholarship that sought to 
refine and revise its expansive claims.  Earlier works focused on the periodization 
of Weber’s argument, demonstrating the vitality of republican culture among 
peasantry prior to Third Republic.15 More recent works have shown the 
complexity of the process of nation-building itself. They focus on the complexities 
of integration, demonstrating the persistence of local and regional institutions and 
identities and their creative adaptation to, rather than wholesale assimilation into, 
the nation. In these revisionist accounts, religious difference, education and 
territorial boundaries have become fertile nodes in the heterogeneous 
“imagining” of the nation.16  The assimilation of regional cultures and languages 
to the national standard through schools, for instance, has been revised by 
several historians who examine the ways local dialects and customs were 
tolerated, if not celebrated, and became integral links between local and national 
identity.17  Religion, too, has been shown to be a powerful vector in the 
negotiation and, at times, contestation of a unitary national identity, as Ford 
demonstrates in Brittany.18 Borderlands and frontiers, often viewed as revealing 
                                                
15 Maurice Agulhon, The Republic in the village: the people of the Var from the French Revolution 
to the Second Republic, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). For 
a re-assessment of French nationhood in the 18th century, see David Bell, The Cult of the Nation 
in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800  (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2001). 
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983). 
17 Anne-Marie Thiesse, Ils apprenaient la France: L'exaltation des régions dans le discours 
patriotique (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1997); Jean-François Chanet, 
L'école republican et les petites patries (Paris: Auber, 1996).  
18 Caroline Ford, Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in 
Brittany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 
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the limits of national integration, are now presented as critical sites in its 
reconfiguration.19  
 
A study of environmental marginality adds to these nuanced accounts of 
state-building and modernization in France by showing how nature itself could 
become a medium through which the terms of nationhood were negotiated. It 
suggests that representations of deforestation, agricultural sterility and insalubrity 
were critical justifications for the extension of state power over rural France. 
Linked to local practices considered ignorant, irrational, or merely apathetic, the 
degraded state of lands became an object of state rationalization in the name of 
the “public good.”  
In pointing out the close relationship between environmental control and 
state power, this dissertation echoes other recent work that illustrates how 
European states consolidated, exercised and extended their political and social 
power through efforts to control and refashion nature. Regulating forest, digging 
canals, channeling rivers and reclaiming marshlands went hand and hand with 
the administrative centralization, social regulation and imperial expansion of 
European states.20 In particular, scholars have reinterpreted the French state in 
                                                
19 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989); Laird Boswell, “Rethinking the Nation at the Periphery,” 113. 
20 See, for instance, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How certain schemes to improve the 
human condition have failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); David Blackburn, The 
Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2006); Dale Porter, The Thames embankment: environment, technology, and 
society in Victorian London (Akron: University of Akron Press, 1998); Patrick Carroll, Science, 
Culture, and Modern State Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Paul 
Warde, Ecology, Economy and State Formation in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Karl Papuan, “Inventing Nature: Forests, Forestry and State 
Power in Renaissance Venice,” Journal of Modern History 72 (2000): 861-89; and Stuart 
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terms of its claims over and transformations of environment. Since the 17th 
century, one finds that state power and environmental control have been tightly 
bound together. Chandra Mukerji has shown the importance of territorial control, 
however contested and fragile, to the early modern French state. Andrée Corvol, 
Tamar Whited and others have exposed the relationships between forest 
regulation and political power. Alice Ingold has shown how regimes of hydraulic 
knowledge inflected the expansion of the French state in 19th century while Sara 
Pritchard has revealed the engineering of the Rhône river as a labor of postwar 
nation-building.21 
Of course, the environmental claims of the French state did not always 
translate into environmental control. While marginal lands became a prime target 
in the expansion of the French state in the nineteenth century, they were far from 
inert sites on which modernization was inscribed. This dissertation contends that 
environmental marginality proved to be fluid and tactical discourse, adaptable by 
different groups as they sought to remake nature for their own ends. While they 
took advantage of the 1857 law forcing villages to sell off their common pasture, 
landowners in the Landes quickly divested themselves of the language of the 
ruined commons as they sought to repair their relations with the rural world 
whose labor they depended on to foster and maintain their new forests. Likewise, 
                                                                                                                                            
McCook,  States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 
1760-1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002). 
21 Chandra Mukerji, Impossible engineering: technology and territoriality on the Canal du Midi 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Andrée Corvol, L'Homme aux Bois: Histoire des 
relations de l'homme et de la forêt (XVIIe-XXe siècle). (Paris: Fayard, 1987); Tamara Whited, 
Forests and Peasant Politics (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 2000); Alice Ingold, “To 
Historicize or Naturalize Nature: Hydraulic Communities and Administrative States in Nineteenth-
Century Europe,” French Historical Studies 32:3 (2009): 385-417; and Sara Pritchard, 
“Reconstructing the Rhône”. 
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landowners in the Camargue took advantage of state engineering expertise and 
capital to build a critical sea wall and drainage infrastructure even as they 
contested the authority of the state to manage these public works. In the alpine 
regions, tourist groups and industrial reformers took up the banner of 
reforestation, though often in ways that eroded or undercut technocratic visions 
of alpine forest. While they embraced the ecological catastrophism of foresters, 
many ended up challenging the expertise of the state to adequately understand, 
let alone manage, local resources like pasture and forest.  
 
The plurality of claims that emerged around the problem of marginal 
environments reflects the point made by Richard White that nature does not 
come to us as a single unified story but rather a buzz of  “competing and complex 
discourses.”22  It is this diversity of “natures” that this dissertation seeks to 
capture. In order to do so, it identifies three main narratives or discourses 
through which environmental marginality was expressed: degradation, risk and 
the public good. While often overlapping, these discourses were distinct circuits 
of environmental knowledge, representations and claims. In each of the case 
studies dealt with here, notions of degradation, risk and the public good were 
deployed in different ways by the state, local inhabitants and civic associations 
as they sought to establish their own relationship to marginal nature and, in the 
process, the French nation.  
 
                                                
22 Richard White, “From Wilderness to Hybrid Landscapes,” 559.  
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Degradationist narratives since the Enlightenment  
 
That narratives of degradation justified the extension of state authority 
over natural resources and local populations has been a key insight of recent 
environmental histories of  European imperialism. 23  Works by Caroline Ford, 
Diane Davis, Frédéric Thomas and Jason Kull, for instance, have investigated 
the ideological dimensions of environmental degradation claims rampant in the 
French colonies of Algeria, Madagascar and Vietnam. They illustrate how 
narratives of deforestation, desiccation, over-pasturage and soil erosion, 
associated with abusive local practices, legitimized colonial claims to land and 
resources. 24  To date, however, there has been little work done on the 
relationship of this language of degradation to the metropolitan context, 
specifically to projects of territorial improvement in rural France. This study 
suggests that, while the imperial experience reshaped environmental thinking in 
important ways, one should not lose sight of some of its domestic roots.  
 
                                                
23 On the origins and impact of European theories of environmental degradation, see Richard 
Grove, Green Imperialism: colonial expansion, tropical island Edens, and the origins of 
environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For an important 
analysis of how representations of degradation shaped colonial and postcolonial state policies 
towards resource management in Africa and India, see James Fairlead and Melissa Leach, 
Misreading the African Landscape: society and ecology in a forest-savanna mosaic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Vasant K. Saberwal, “Science and the Desiccationist 
Discourse of the Twentieth Century”, Environment and History 4 (1998): 309-343. 
24 Diana K. Davis, Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: environmental history and French colonial 
expansion in North Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Caroline Ford, “Reforestation, 
Landscape Conservation, and the Anxieties of Empire in French Colonial Algeria,” American 
Historical Review 113  (2008): 341-362; Frédéric Thomas, “Protection des forêts et 
environnementalisme colonial: Indochina, 1860-1945,” Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 56:4 (2009): 104-136; and Jason Kull, “Deforestation, Erosion, and Fire: 




The problem of marginal lands emerged from Enlightenment and 
Revolutionary concerns over the proper relationship between society and nature. 
The persistence of unproductive and uncultivated land was a perennial concern 
in the eighteenth century. At the end of Louis XIV’s reign, the royal military 
engineer Vauban had estimated that “wastelands” accounted for thirty percent of 
French territory. Faced with a growing demand for both food production and state 
revenue, the French monarchy turned its attention to the expansion of arable, 
and therefore taxable, land. Royal inquiries into the extent of wastelands in the 
provinces, as well as small-scale initiatives in reclamation and défrichement (the 
clearance of wastelands), reflected this growing spirit of agricultural reform.25  
Yet, by the end of the eighteenth century, marginal lands remained a prominent 
feature of national territory. In his well-known Travels in France (1792), the 
English agricultural reformer Arthur Young lamented over the 11 million hectares 
of wasteland that continued to blight the French countryside.26 
Attitudes towards marginal lands reflected the distinction between 
cultivated and uncultivated nature fundamental to eighteenth century perceptions 
of environment. Cereal crops, vineyards and prairies were regarded as the 
prestige of civilization, the fruit of human labor and ingenuity, and the durable 
wealth of nations. Productive lands were not only aesthetically pleasing but 
healthful as well. Influenced by neo-Hippocratic theories of health, 
                                                
25 Keith Sutton, “Reclamation of Wasteland During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in 
Themes in the Historical Geography of France, ed. Hugh D. Clout (London: Academic Press, 
1977), 255-258; Noelle Plack, “Agrarian Reform and Ecological Change during the Ancient 
Régime: Land Clearance, Peasants and Viticulture in the Province of Languedoc,” French History 
19:2 (2005), 189-210; and J.L. Rosenthal, The Fruits of Revolution: Property rights, litigation and 
French agriculture, 1700-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 39-58.  
26 G. Gavignaud-Fontaine, La Révolution rurale de la France contemporaine, XVIIIe-XXe siècle  
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), 34.  
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contemporaries associated cultivated nature with the circulation of “good” air and 
water. Uncultivated nature, by contrast, was shunned. Craggy peaks, tangled 
forests, stagnant marshlands and rough pasture were considered ugly, 
dangerous and unhealthy, a threat to the rational ordering of landscape. 27 
The demonization of uncultivated landscapes owed much to Physiocratic 
theories of agricultural wealth and property. Enlightenment Physiocrats and 
agronomists regarded agricultural production as the basis for national wealth. By 
subtracting arable land from national territory, marginal environments 
undermined the basis of economic, and therefore social, progress.28  
A profound critique of communal lands and collective rights underpinned 
Physiocratic notions of productive nature. As elsewhere in Europe, the 
unregulated and open use of common lands, as well customary use rights on 
private lands such as grazing, gleaning, and wood-cutting, were considered 
sources of environmental degradation, producing sterile, chaotic, even 
catastrophic, landscapes. 29  “One cannot repeat it enough,” wrote the compte 
                                                
27  A number of scholars have observed the importance of cultivated-uncultivated distinction to 
perceptions of nature in the eighteenth century. See Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier, “L’environnement 
vu par des notables locaux à la fin du XVIIIe siècle,” in Du Milieu à l’environnement: Pratiques et 
représentations du rapport homme-nature depuis la Renaissance, ed. Marie-Claire Robic  (Paris: 
Economica, 1992), 64-66; Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, “L’image des terres incultes: La lande, la 
friche, le marais,” in La Nature en Revolution, 1750-1800, ed. A. Corvo (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1993), 17, 25; Yves Luginbuhl, “Sauvage-cultivé: l'ordre social de l'harmonie des paysages,” in 
Du rural à l'environnement: la question de la nature aujourd'hui, eds. N. Mathieu and M. Jollivet 
(Paris: Harmattan, 1989), 42-49 ; and Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the 
French Social Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
28 P.M. Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 18; Gavignaud-Fontaine, La Révolution rurale de la France contemporaine, 34. 
29 Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution, 137-154. For a comprehensive analysis of 
debates over the commons since the Enlightenment, see Nadine Vivier, Proprieté collective et 
identité communal: Les biens communaux en France, 1750-1914 (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1998), 14-18. For a broader account of the significance of common land in Europe, 
see M. De Moor et al., “Comparing the historical commons,” in The Management of Common 
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d’Essuiles in 1770, one of the most prominent Physiocratic opponents of the 
commons: “[E]ach exercise of communal right is but the perpetuation of ruin and 
pillage.”30 For d’Essuiles and many of his contemporaries, the degraded and 
“catastrophic” commons were key obstacles to both economic and social 
progress. Envying the productive gains that enclosure policies had secured for 
England, Physiocrats and their supporters lobbied for the division and 
privatization of communal lands and the eradication of collective use rights, 
though with little effect.  
A growing concern under the Old Regime, marginal lands posed sterner 
political and social challenges for Revolutionary France. Frequently consisting of 
common pasture, marsh and forest, they nurtured the very kinds of ownership 
that revolutionaries were trying to do away with. For members of the Convention 
who cherished the ideals of private property and administrative uniformity, the 
mosaic of local property relations that characterized marginal regions smacked of 
the Old Regime and its archaic customs. The privatization of the communal 
lands, many revolutionaries believed, would create a new class of freehold 
peasant proprietors, thereby “attach[ing] the inhabitants of the countryside to the 
Revolution.”31 Yet, though it effectively disposed of seigniorial and ecclesiastic 
property regimes, the Revolution failed to conquer the commons. The sheer 
diversity of communal practices and widespread resistance to their erosion 
resigned legislators to a weak compromise. Neither the Code rural of 1791, 
                                                                                                                                            
Land in North West Europe 1500-1850, eds. M. De Moor, L. Shaw-Taylor and P.S. Warde 
(Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2002), 16-17. 
30 Compte d’ Essuile, Traité politique et économique des communes (Paris, 1770), 63.  
31 Quoted in M. Bloch, French Rural History: An essay on its basic characteristics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), 243.  
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which attempted to balance  the extension of  individual property rights with a 
recognition of customary rights, nor the 1793 partition law, which authorized the 
voluntary sale of non-wooded communal lands, revolutionized property relations 
in the countryside.32  
 
These efforts of rural reform ensured that the specter of degraded 
“catastrophic” nature would continue to haunt French administrators in the 
nineteenth century.33  For one thing, the state got better at “seeing” marginal 
lands. Prior the cadastral surveys ordered by Napoléon in 1807, most marginal 
land was not even recorded in land registers since, by virtue of either its real or 
claimed unproductivity, it was not taxed. Always concerned with increasing 
arable and taxable lands, succeeding regimes became more adept at cataloging 
French territory. Cadastral surveys, commissioned by Napoleon and completed 
between the 1820s and 1840s, vastly increased the cartographic knowledge of 
the state, while agricultural censuses provided more detailed inventories of the 
lands in each department.34 In this new cataloging of national territory, southern 
France appeared as a bastion of marginal lands. Across Languedoc, Provence 
and Gascony, as well as the southern Alps and Pyrenees, the problem of 
                                                
32 Daniel Solakian, “Territoires naturels et communautés: la loi du 14 août 1792-10 juin 1793,” in 
La nature en révolution, 145-155. 
33 For more on the discourse of the catastrophic commons in the 19th century, see Vivier, “The 
management and use of the commons,” in The Management of Common Land in North West 
Europe 1500-1850,145; Luginbuhl, Paysages, 150. 
34 It is interesting to note that the early cadastral surveys, completed between the 1820s and 
1840s, cataloged over 16% of national territory as wasteland, not far off from Arthur Young’s 
estimate. Keith Sutton, “Reclamation of Wasteland,” 262. 
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degraded nature- specifically communal pasture and marsh- became an 
increasing source of concern among state officials. 35 
The discourse of the catastrophic commons was widely adopted by 
engineers and foresters in the nineteenth century. For them, marginal 
environments were symptoms not so much of inevitable natural processes but 
abusive local practices. Communal grazing, incineration, and marsh cultivation 
were not only inefficient forms of exploitation, ill-suited to the commercial and 
industrial needs of a modern nation such as France; they were also agents of 
environmental degradation. Sterility, insalubrity and degradation were viewed as 
the environmental consequences of human abuse and apathy.  If these 
catastrophic landscapes could be mastered, the nation would have claimed a 
major victory over both nature and archaic local custom. This discourse of 
catastrophe became, in the words of Serge Briffaud, a powerful “alibi for a politics 
of intervention.”36  
  
Environmental risk and modernization 
 
The renewed prominence of marginal lands in both public discourse and 
state policy during the Second Empire reflected growing concerns over 
environmental hazards and the challenges they posed to territorial 
modernization. The increased frequency and intensity of major flooding along the 
                                                
35Of course, common lands existed elsewhere, most notably in the northeastern regions of Alsace 
and Lorraine. Unlike in southern France, however, the commons were considered far more 
productive and integrated into the market economy, either as leased arable land or as timber 
forests. Vivier, “The management and use of the commons,” 148-9.  
36 Serge Briffaud, Naissance d'un paysage: la montagne pyrénéenne à la croisée des regards, 
XVI-XIX siècles. (Toulouse: CIMA-CNRS, 1994), 391. 
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Loire, Rhone, Garonne and Seine, culminating in the great floods of 1856-7, had 
fed anxieties over alpine deforestation and erosion that had been percolating 
since before the French Revolution. Deforested mountain slopes were believed 
to be the main cause of catastrophic flooding that threatened cities, factories, 
bridges, roads and railways, not to mention rural communities. As Napoleon III 
famously promised at the opening of the 1857 parliamentary session, “rivers, like 
revolution, will return to their beds and remain unable to rise during my reign.”37 
  At the same time, concerns over sterile nature, particularly in light of 
liberalizing efforts to develop commercial infrastructure and loosen trade 
restrictions, made the extension of arable lands a top priority for state 
administrators. Lowland communal pasture and marshlands, as in the Landes 
and Camargue, were not only inimical to agricultural production and individual 
property rights but public health, their lack of drainage and stagnant waters 
associated with sickness and disease.38  
Marginal lands were, in fact, at the heart of an emerging geography of risk 
that divided national territory into protective mountains and productive plains. In 
the technocratic imagination, degraded uplands would be divested of extensive 
pasturage and subsistence agriculture in favor of erosion- and flood- resistant 
forests while unproductive lowlands would be developed for intensive cash crops 
                                                
37 Quoted in Whited, Forests and Peasant Politics, 58. For an interpretation of the 1856 floods as 
a turning point in the “nationalization” of natural catastrophes, see A. Méjean, “Utilisation politique 
d'une catastrophe: le voyage de Napoléon III en Provence durant la grande crue de 1856,” Revue 
historique 597 (1996): 133-152. 
38 State concerns over insalubrious wetlands was also reflected in efforts to eradicate the artificial 
ponds created through the diking and canalization of rivers in regions like the Brennes, Dombes 
and Sologne, where pisciculture proved more economically-viable than agriculture. E. Rouher, 
“Rapport à l'Empereur,” Le Moniteur Universel, 27 February 1860, 237-239. Also see Jean-Marie 
Derex, “Pour une histoire des zones humides en France (XVIIe-XIXe siècle): Des paysages 
oubliés, une histoire à écrire,” Histoire et sociétés rurales 15 (2001): 11-36.  
 
 21 
linked to national markets. This “imagined rationalization of plain and mountain,” 
as Tamara Whited puts it, was in effect a language of risk deployed by state 
experts attempting to fashion a landscape suited for the commercial and 
industrial needs of the nation. 39 
  
Risk, social theorists have maintained, is not synonymous with dangers, 
threats and hazards, whether natural or man-made. Rather, it is the ways these 
dangers are mapped onto social institutions and human bodies. While 
“constructivist” interpretations of risk vary, they agree on the basic premise that 
risks cannot be divorced from social, technological and ecological orders through 
which they are perceived, regulated and experienced. According to the 
anthropologist Mary Douglas, risk cannot be reduced to a calculation of objective 
threats or danger; rather, the perception and evaluation of risk are rooted in the 
social structures and cultural values of specific groups. 40 Other scholars, 
influenced by Foucaultian concepts of governmentality and biopower, view risk 
as the invention, rather than the object, of regulatory institutions. As Mitchell 
Dean argues, what matters is not risk itself but the forms of knowledge that make 
it “thinkable”, the techniques that make it visible, the technologies that try to 
govern it, and the forms of political rationality that deploy it.41 The work of Ulrich 
Beck and Anthony Giddens, while acknowledging the political instrumentality and 
                                                
39 T. Whited, Forests and Peasant Politics in Modern France, 54-55. 
40 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of 
Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
41 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage Publiations, 
1999), 178. For an overview of the intersection of risk theory and governmentality studies, see 
Deborah Lupton, Risk (London: Routledge, 1999), 86-106. 
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regulatory animus of risk, suggests that the production of new risks is the 
hallmark of modern industrial society.42 For them, modernity has led to a 
proliferation of real technological and environmental risks that both drive and 
outstrip the forms of expertise and “norms of calculability” designated to evaluate 
and regulate them. 43 
The concept of risk has become an important category of analysis among 
French historians, particularly those working at the intersection of environment, 
technology and state-building. While social theorists tend to view modern risk 
and risk society as a product of the postwar conjunction of technology, industry 
and global finance, French historians have shown how the identification, 
regulation and production of risks characterized much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries as well. Nineteenth century cities, for instance, generated 
specific kinds and cultures of risk.44 Along with smoke pollution, industrial wastes 
and sewage came the regulatory practices that sought to manage the health and 
environmental risks they posed.45 Natural hazards and disasters have also been 
treated as sources of risk culture. Catastrophes such as floods, avalanches, and 
earthquakes, while the result of natural processes, were also political events, 
calling forth a host of regulatory and interventionist techniques that sought to re-
                                                
42 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambrige: Polity Press, 1999); Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990). 
43 Beck, World Risk Society, 4. 
44 Soraya Boudia and Nathalie Jas, “Introduction: Risk and ‘Risk Society’ in Historical 
Perspective,” History and Technology 23: 4 (2007): 318; Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, “Beck Back in 
the 19th Century: Towards a Genealogy of Risk Society,” History and Technology  23: 4 (2007): 
333–350. 
45 Geneviève Massard-Guilbaud, Histoire de la pollution industrielle en France, 1789-1914 (Paris: 
Éditions de l’EHESS, 2010); Thomas Le Roux, “Les nuisances artisanales et industrielles à Paris 
sous la Révolution et le Consulat (1789-1804),” in A Paris et la révolution. Nouvelles approches 
de la ville, ed. Monnier Raymonde (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2008), 127-137; and J.B. 
Fressoz, “The Gas-Lighting Controversy. Technological Risk, Expertise and Regulation in 
Nineteenth Century Paris and London,” Journal of Urban History 33 5 (2007). 
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establish social order and extend political authority.46  
Marginal environments offer another view onto the emergence of risk as 
an organizing set of relations between political institutions, social groups and 
their surroundings. The identification of risky landscapes became a tactic of state 
power to lay claim to local resources and reform local populations.  The hazards 
associated with marginal regions- deforestation, erosion, flooding, and disease-
were real, leaving their traces on landscapes, bodies and memories. They 
became risks when the French state attributed them to the abusive practices of 
local populations and represented them as threats to a public good that it sought 
to preserve and promote. As noted above, engineering and forestry 
administrations played a key role in rendering the problem of marginal lands 
“visible” and, hence, available as sites of state intervention. Through their tireless 
on-site surveys and meticulous reports and maps, state engineers and foresters 
rendered marginal lands and their users into environmental risks. Elevation 
studies of tree growth, assessments of deforestation, photographic records, 
agricultural surveys and hydraulic flow studies all measured the degree to which 
                                                
46 There are a number of works that deal with changing attitudes towards natural catastrophe and 
environmental risk in France. See, among others, Grégory Quenet, Les tremblements de terre 
aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. La naissance d’un risque  (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2005); René 
Favier and Anne-Marie Granet-Abisset, “Society and Natural Risks in France, 1500-2000: 
Changing Historical Perspectives,” in Natural Disasters, Cultural Responses, eds. Christof Mauch 
and Christian Pfister  (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009); . René Favier and Anne-Marie Granet-
Abisset, eds., Histoire et mémoire des risques naturels, eds (Grenoble : Maison des Sciences de 
l'Homme-Alpes, 2000); and A. Méjean, “Utilisation politique d'une catastrophe: le voyage de 
Napoléon III en Provence durant la grande crue de 1856,” Revue historique 597 (1996): 133-152.  
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l'environnement, eds. C. Beck and R. Delort (Paris: CNRS, 1993), 105-112 and S. Briffaud, “Le 
rôle des catastrophes naturelles: Cas de Pyrénées centrales,” in La Nature en révolution, 1750-





these landscapes diverged from ideal models of rational territory and their 
inhabitants from ideal models of citizenship. 
Environmental margins also, however, reveal some of the limitations of 
risk studies, namely the tendency to focus primarily on experts as the 
gatekeepers of what constitutes risk for a particular society. The discourse of 
environmental risk embedded in state projects of lowland reclamation, 
afforestation, alpine restoration and flood control was only partially controlled by 
experts. The French state, in the form of its cadre of engineers and foresters, had 
to contend with alternate voices (sometimes even within its own ranks). Was a 
marsh a sickly wasteland or a productive local resource? Were deforested alpine 
slopes evidence of wasteful and short-sighted exploitation or ecologically-sound 
resource use? Were communal moors unproductive wastelands or carefully 
managed agro-pastoral landscapes? In the sites studied here, discourses of risk 
appear at once heterogeneous and contingent. Enlisted by the state to legitimize 
its interventionist policies of territorial improvement, they could also be 
appropriate by non-state groups to justify their own claims over and interventions 
into marginal environments.  
The relationship between modernization and environmental risk goes 
beyond efforts to regulate natural and man-made hazards, however. It also 
opens up new perspectives on state-society relations and the problem of 
governance in France. Whether in Landes, the Alps or the Camargue, the 
problem of marginal environments called into question not only the boundaries 
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between state and local society but the notion of the public good that knit the 
nation together.  
 
Governing nature: the problem of the public good 
 
The notion of the public good was a ubiquitous, if ambivalent, feature of 
public discourse in the nineteenth century. As Yves Charbit points out, its 
universalist pretensions, stemming from the French Revolution, became a crucial 
means through which the emerging bourgeoisie sought to define its identity and 
authority in the context of the widening social and economic divisions wrought by 
industrialization and urbanization. For liberal thinkers, in particular, the public 
good became an ideal that promised the reconciliation of economic progress and 
social peace.  On the one hand, it stood for the free market, the unimpeded 
production and circulation goods and services; on the other, it implied that 
economic growth should be carried out in ways that promoted prosperity, security 
and health.47  
The discourse of the public good was also a crucial aspect of state claims 
over the environment in 19th century France. Under the Second Empire, debates 
over the public good spread from the heaving cities to the unruly countryside 
where the specters of depopulation, under-production, isolation and, increasingly, 
natural disasters appeared to threaten the economic and social order.48 It was 
deeply-ingrained in both engineering and forestry circles, where it stood- in 
                                                
47 Yves Charbit, Du malthusianisme au populationnisme: Les Economistes français et la 
population, 1840-1870 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1981), 77. 
48 Charbit, Du malthusianisme au populationnisme, 88. 
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theory at least- for the wide-spread benefits to the nation over the narrow 
interests of both private capital and local tradition. The ideal of the public good 
not only served as a powerful justification for state intervention, it also deeply 
shaped the identity and sense of mission among those dedicated to managing 
the resources of the nation.49 
The convergence of liberal and statist discourses of the public good 
reflected the economic and political obstacles to transforming marginal 
environments. The ambitions of foresters and engineers to rationalize what they 
viewed as marginal nature often outstripped their own financial and political 
resources. Territorial improvement projects of reforestation, afforestation and 
reclamation never commanded the budgets that Parisian boulevards or new 
railway lines did. 50 In addition, since the establishment of universal male suffrage 
in 1848, rural populations had become a political force, one the French state 
could not afford to alienate. To succeed, projects of territorial improvement had to 
balance the coercive threat of the state with a certain economic and political 
realism that called for the collaboration of local inhabitants.  
The emergence of the public good as a legitimatizing discourse of 
environmental control reflected the growing presence of the French state in the 
countryside. As recent work in rural history suggests, before mid-century the idea 
of the state as an abstract and juridical agent of the public good was the 
exception rather than the rule in the political imaginaries of most rural 
                                                
49 See Theodore Porter, Trust in numbers: the pursuit of objectivity in science and public life. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 114-125; A. Picon, L'Invention de l'ingénieur 
moderne: L'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, 1747-1851 (Paris: Presses de l'Ecole nationale des 
Ponts et Chaussées, 1992), 306-7. 
50 Girard, La politique des Travaux publics du Second Empire, 31-2, 230-237. 
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communities. 51  Instead, the state often appeared as a distant and predatory 
power, its reach felt most directly in policies of taxation, conscription, and 
communal property restrictions that were experienced as direct impingements of 
village life. Resistance could be hard or soft, ranging from revolts against and 
attacks on state agents and wide-spread desertion of conscripted individuals to 
illicit inheritance practices and tax avoidance. 52 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as the interests of state and 
local society become increasingly enmeshed, perceptions of the state shift from a 
predatory agent to a useful, if not entirely benevolent, dispenser of the public 
good.53 After all, the central institutions of the state, such as schools, courts and 
police- all resided in the commune. As a number of works point out, local 
institutions, far from being eroded by state centralization and political 
acculturation, became its vital conduit and mediator.54 Since the law of 14 
December 1789, the commune had been the basic civic unit of France. Over 
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52 Inspired by Alain Corbin’s thesis of the persistence of an “archaic” peasant mentalities well 
after the Revolution, recent research had focused on the rural resistance and negotiation of state-
driven processes of modernization and acculturation. See A.-E. Demartini and D. Kalifa, eds., 
Imaginaire et sensibilités au 19e siècle: Études pour Alain Corbin (Paris: Créaphis, 2005); 
Christian Thibon, Pays de Sault. Les Pyrénées audoises au 19e siècle: les villages et l’État (Paris: 
Éditions du CNRS, 1988); J.N. Luc, ed., Gendarmerie, État et société au 19e siècle (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002); and Édouard Lynch, Entre la commune et la nation. Identité 
communautaire et pratique politique en vallée de Campan (Hautes-Pyrénées) au 19e siècle 
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53 Francois Ploux, “Production and recomposition des identites villageoises en France,” in Histoire 
de l’Europe rurale contemporaine, Du Village à L'Etat , ed. Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger (Paris: A. 
Colin, 2006), 50-1. 
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during the Second Empire and Third Republic, see Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to 
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44,000 communes were created, each with a complete municipal administrative 
architecture of mayor, judges, police and general council that negotiated the 
boundaries between state and local society.55 As Francois Ploux has recently 
observed, it was “at the level of the commune that the peasant encountered the 
state.”56 
Familiarity with a language of the public good did not imply uniform 
acceptance or even shared meaning. In some ways, the increasing proximity of 
state and local society magnified their different perspectives on the public good. 
As Alice Ingold notes, the emergence of the public good as an expression of 
national collectivity coincided with the decline of local forms of collectivity such as 
communal lands and use rights. This “shift in scale in the definition of the 
common good” was most evident in conflicts over marginal regions where 
collective ownership and use rights remained a critical part of local economies 
and social relations. 57  Appropriated by local groups, the discourse of the public 
good could become a powerful solvent to projects that devalue their claims to 
property, place and environment. From the perspective of the environmental 
margins, then, the public good might be better viewed not so much as an 
ideological ruse of administrative centralization but as a fluid and heterodox, if 
not entirely equal, dialogue between local communities and the state. 58  
                                                
55 Isser Woloch, Transformations of the French Civic Order, 34.  
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recherche et d'enseignement”, unpublished article, 2003. 
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Structure of Chapters 
  
The first section of the dissertation maps out the emergence of 
environmental marginality as a critical dimension of state power under the 
Second Empire. It focuses on three of the most well-known and ambitious 
schemes to transform marginal nature:  the alpine restoration campaign, the 
forestation of the Landes, and the reclamation of the Camargue. Each chapter 
explores how narratives of environmental degradation, risk and the public good 
were enlisted as justifications for state intervention and the material 
transformation of local landscapes. At the same time, they attempt to recover the 
tactics of rural communities as they tried to modulate these projects in ways that 
served their own interests.  
Chapter Two explores the emergence and fitful implementation of alpine 
reforestation, focusing on the southern Alps and Pyrenees. It argues that, while 
state foresters drew liberally on narratives of degradation, deforestation and the 
“catastrophic” commons, they also sought to modulate their efforts to reform 
alpine society through appeals to the public good. Chapter Three charts the 
efforts of the French state to transform the notorious wastelands of the Landes 
de Gascogne into monoculture pine forest. It demonstrates how state engineers, 
initially justifying the project of forestation through an ideology of the 
“catastrophic” commons, found themselves at odds with the local landowners 
who sought to shape forestation for their own ends. Chapter Four turns to the 
Camargue and explores how hydraulic discourses of salubrity and circulation 
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interlaced with local attitudes towards water control to shape the agricultural and 
industrial transformation of the delta.  
The second section of the dissertation describes how marginal landscapes 
of the nineteenth century became privileged sites of conservation and 
preservation in the twentieth. It demonstrates how efforts at territorial 
rationalization, initially framed by the expansion of modern state, were recast by 
both rural groups and emerging urban movements of nature conservation and 
preservation of the early 20th century. Notions of environmental risk and the 
public good, so key to state intervention into rural society, migrated to urban and 
middle-class groups intent on forging their own relationship between nature and 
nation.  
 Chapter Five examines how associations like the Association de 
l’aménagement des montagnes and the Touring Club de France  adopted the 
cause of alpine restoration as they sought to remake the mountains of France 
into aesthetic and productive resources of the nation. Chapter Six explores how 
forest owners in the Landes vacillated between local and expert strategies of fire 
management. Local landowners grappled with the problem of fire in their new 
forests by mobilizing ideas of property and risk that, while countering state claims 
to the forest, also undermined public forms of management. Chapter Seven 
explores how technocratic efforts to rationalize marginal nature in the Camargue 
provoked some of the earliest movements for nature preservation. It argues that 
the collaboration of Félibrige regionalists and Parisian naturalists to create one of 
the first wildlife refuges was spurred by their shared concerns over the impact of 
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engineering and reclamation projects to the fragile delta and its natural and 
human communities.  
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In the spring of 1856 a series of floods wreaked havoc along France’s 
major river basins.  Heavy rains, combined with snow melt from the mountains, 
turned the Loire and Rhône in raging cataracts. Flood waters rose to over seven 
meters in some regions, overwhelming dikes and embankments. The floods 
became a national event as frantic telegraphs from the far-flung provinces were 
recorded daily in the Moniteur Universel. The provincial cities of Blois and Tours 
along the Loire and Lyon, Avignon and Arles on the Rhône all reported suffering 
considerable damage. According to the hastily organized relief commission, the 
floods had caused an estimated 177 million francs in damage across forty-one 
departments.1  
Napoleon III, whose rise to imperial sovereignty owed much to the support 
of rural populations, was quick to take political advantage of the floods. Intent on 
burnishing his populist credentials prior to the 1857 legislative elections, the 
emperor set off from Paris on the night of June 1, incognito, on a tour of the 
hardest hit regions. Beginning in Lyon, the Emperor traveled down the Rhône, 
                                                
1 Archives nationales françaises (hereafter AN) F14 16575, “Rapport concernant les mesures 
adoptés pour la distribution des secours extraordinaires aux Inondés de 1856.”   
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distributing donations to flood victims along the way.  The catastrophe highlighted 
the ideals of enlightened authority and civic paternalism that defined his regime.2 
As one official chronicle solemnly observed, the enraged waters provided the 
perfect theater for the demonstration of imperial charity, “as if Providence 
wanted, at the moment of a great calamity…to show once more to the nation the 
[Emperor] towards whom all citizens, when the alarm sounds…must look towards 
and plead for the aid that he alone can understand and achieve.”3 A report from 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works ventured that the floods 
“left behind [not only] the memory of a catastrophe the likes of which this era had 
never seen [but] the sentiment of profound recognition towards the acts of 
devotion and benevolence exampled by the Emperor.”4 The prevention of natural 
catastrophes, like social unrest, had become a measure of political authority and 
legitimacy under the Second Empire. At the opening of the legislative sessions of 
1857, the Emperor promised the nation that “rivers, like revolution, will return to 
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1857), 5. 
4 AN  F14 16575, Behic, “Rapport à Sa Majesté l’Empereur sur les Inondations de 1856.”  
5  Quoted in Jean-Luc Mayaud, “Le Second Empire: faîte économique ou épisode négligeable?” 









Concerns of political economy as much as moral legitimacy shaped the 
imperial regime’s response to the floods. Unruly rivers threatened the program of 
territorial modernization or aménagement du territoire that defined the domestic 
policy of the Second Empire. In his programme de paix of January 5, 1860, 
Napoleon III outlined a comprehensive policy to liberalize the economy, improve 
transport and infrastructure and increase both agricultural and industrial credit.6 
Flooding along the nation’s major river basins endangered the commercial links 
between Paris and the periphery, particularly along the major arteries of the 
Loire, which served the ports of western France, and the Rhône, which opened 
                                                
6 Moniteur Universel, 15 January 1860.  
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onto Marseilles and the Mediterranean. Nature could not be allowed to disturb 
this imperial vision of national territory as a grand circuitry of goods and capital.7   
In July1860, the Corps legislatifs passed the first law on alpine 
reforestation. Over fourteen articles, the law outlined a project to  reforest 
hundreds of thousands of hectares across Pyrenees, Cévennes and Alps. It 
authorized the Eaux et Forêts Administration to carry out reforestation projects 
wherever deforestation and erosion were found.  Its main objective was to reduce 
the threat of flooding along the major river basins, major conduits for national 
commerce. It was clearly one of the most ambitious attempts at environmental 
engineering in the nineteenth century.  
Scholars have tended to attribute the law to the authoritarian currents of 
the Second Empire, viewing it as an expression of territorial control at odds with 
local practice. As the instrument of distant administrators and zealous foresters 
intent on rationalizing national territory, reforestation policies occluded the logic 
of local resource use, namely the vital importance of communal pasturage to 
alpine economies. According to Andrée Corvol, the leading historian of forests in 
France, “official discourse always denied any rationality in the relations between 
rural society and the Tree.” For the sociologist Bernard Kalaora, reforestation 
policies privileged the “representation of an abstract, de-territorialized and 
Jacobin landscape” over “native” economic and social relations. Tamara Whited, 
in her finely textured account of reforestation efforts in the departments of Ariège 
                                                
7 The notion of circulation- of products, people and ideas-was an essential component of 
modernization, as both the object of public works and as a metaphor of progress itself. See 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey : the industrialization of time and space in the 19th 
century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 188-197; Antoine Picon,  Les Saint-
Simoniens: Raison, imaginaire et utopie. (Paris: Belin, 2002), 297-303. 
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and Savoie, comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that the basic tension in 
alpine reforestation emerged from the imposition of a  “technocratic vision of 
rationalized landscape” on the “humanized mountain” of local alpine 
communities.8   
Yet, as this chapter argues, policies of reforestation were more than just 
oppressive technologies of state intervention. From the very beginning, it was 
clear that they would have to be a collaborative effort, requiring the support of 
local populations. The French state had neither the financial means nor the 
political stomach for protracted skirmishes along its periphery. In the actual 
policies enacted by French lawmakers and fitfully carried out by foresters, one 
finds a practical flexibility that, while not necessarily erasing an institutional bias 
against local practices, blurs any hard and fast line between state visions and 
local realities.   
Property rights and notions of the public good became important currency 
in the exchanges between foresters and local inhabitants. Alpine reforestation 
attacked communal pasturage as the main cause of deforestation, erosion and, 
ultimately, catastrophic flooding, clear threats to the both local communities and 
the nation at large. Invoking the public good, a recurring theme in texts and 
official reports, was a powerful tactic to legitimize state intervention into these 
local landscapes. Yet it was a concept that privileged the downstream interests of 
industry and commerce over that of local communities and their subsistence 
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economies. Moreover, it posited the value of individual property rights over 
communal ones as the key to rational resource management.  The French state 
found itself in the difficult position of convincing local populations to amend their 
traditional practices through appeals to an abstract public good that largely 
excluded them. The mountains, it seemed, could not serve two masters. 
 
Ruined Nature: Deforestation and the légende noire of the French 
Revolution  
 
The health of French forests had long been a preoccupation of the French 
state. The 1669 Forest Ordinance established under Louis XIV codified a series 
of regulations to protect forests, underlining their vital importance as raw 
materials for defense and war.9 During the course of the eighteenth century, the 
expansion of agriculture and industry stressed the nation’s forests as never 
before. The French state found itself caught between the need to feed to its 
growing population and the maintenance of its woodland resources. Land 
clearance or défrichement policies, heralded by agronomists and Physiocrats 
convinced that agricultural wealth was the pillar of a strong nation, ran up against 
the growing fear that the nation’s forests were in decline.10 According to the 
comte d’Essuiles, who undertook several fact-finding missions for the Intendant 
of Finance in the last years of the Old Regime, French forests outside the royal 
                                                
9 In extending monarchical sovereignty over all French forests, the ordinance was a defining 
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parks were suffering a sharp decline, “ most of which was due to local plunder 
and the devastation of grazing beasts.”11 
The French Revolution intensified this territorial dilemma between forest 
and field. The abolition of seignorial and ecclesiastical property allowed local 
inhabitants to exploit lands once restricted in both access and use. While the 
extension of private property to the rural masses was seen by many as an 
essential component of establishing the new nation,  the unregulated clearance 
of land threatened to ruin the very territory the Revolution sought to transform. 
Peasants, it was said, plundered the forests like “cabbage from the garden.”12 If 
France had cast off the social and political shackles of the Old Regime, it now 
faced wide-spread environmental destruction. Forty-five laws were passed 
between 1790 and 1795 in an attempt to halt what the agronomist Coupé de 
l’Oise referred to as the “greedy fury of clearances” which, perpetuated by poor 
peasants, was consuming the nation’s forests through fire, axe and plow.13  
Amidst this tableaux of environmental ruin, mountains took on particular 
significance. In a report delivered to the National Convention on April 8 1793,  
Claude Fabre de l’Herault warned his colleagues of the danger deforested 
mountains posed to the new nation: “What have become of these immense 
forests that once covered the peaks of our mountains? Their naked summits now 
offer only arid wasteland.  Careless egotism, always concerning itself with the 
present, has destroyed this important branch of the rural economy. Let us hasten 
                                                
11 Quoted in Devèze, “Les Forêts françaises,”183. 
12 Denis Woronoff, “La ‘dévastation révolutionnaire’ des forêts”, in Révolution et espaces 
forestiers, ed. Denis Woronoff (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1988), 47. 
13 Peter McPhee, “‘The misguided greed of peasants’? Popular attitudes to the environment in the 
Revolution of 1789," French Historical Studies 24 2 (2001): 247-269. 
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to repair these evils of which the future race is threatened; let us encourage 
those who can rejuvenate the oak and pine in our mountains.”14  
Fears over alpine deforestation were heightened by the growing conviction 
that it contributed to severe flooding along the nation’s major waterways, 
particularly in southern France. Throughout the latter half of the 18th  century, 
engineers and administrators had speculated that the increased frequency of 
flooding was due to excessive land clearance in alpine regions.15 Engineers in 
the province of Roussillon, for instance, had blamed the increase of floods 
between 1760 and 1790 on the degradation of alpine lands.16  
It was not until the Revolution that the association between deforestation 
and lowland flooding became widespread, thanks in large part to the publication 
of Jean-Antoine Fabre’s Essai sur la theorie des torrens et des rivières in 1797. A 
Ponts-et-Chaussées engineer stationed in the department of the Var, Fabre had 
witnessed first hand the degradation of the southern Alps and its disastrous 
effects along the Durance river basin. While acknowledging effects of 
precipitation, avalanches and alternate cycles of freezing and thawing on soil 
erosion and run-off, Fabre believed that recent deforestation and land clearance 
had accelerated this natural degradation into a man-made catastrophe. His 
theory rested on an assumption that forests acted like a great sponge, absorbing 
                                                
14 Cited in Daniel Solakian, “Territoires naturels et communautés: la loi du 14 août 1792-10 juin 
1793,” in La nature en révolution, 1750-1800, ed. Andrée Corvol (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 154. 
15 Serge Briffaud, “Le rôle des catastrophes naturelles: Cas de Pyrénées centrales,” in La Nature 
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excess waters through their roots and accumulated humus and allowing a slow 
release over the course of the year. With the loss of forests, the entire 
hydrological cycle came unhinged.  Water ran unimpeded, accelerating erosion 
and feeding torrents and larger rivers with a slurry of alpine detritus. 17   These 
turgid waters widened river beds, endangered agricultural lands and irrigation 
systems, threatened public infrastructure such as dikes, roads and bridges 
before, finally, depositing their accumulated sediments at the mouths of ports, 
endangering maritime traffic through the creation of sandbars. In short, by 
upsetting the hydrological order, deforestation threatened the very foundations of 
French territory. 
Throughout the alpine periphery, administrators and engineers confirmed 
Fabre’s fears, attributing the intensification of floods to the local destruction of 
forests.   In the department of the Basses-Alpes, the engineer Martin described 
how “ the division of commons and the concessions made to individual 
landowners have brought the most shocking abuses…Mountainsides have been 
stripped of all vegetation that impedes the flow of water… Floods have become 
far more dangerous than before.”18 Officials lamented the same year that the 
“slopes of our most beautiful hills are laid bare”, allowing even “the smallest 
streams [to] become torrents”, threatening the crops, herds and houses of local 
communities. 19  Department officials in the Aude testified to a sharp increase in 
                                                
17 Jean-Antoine Fabre, Essai sur la theorie des torrens et des rivières (Paris: Bidault, 1797), v. 
For a discussion of Fabre as an important precursor to 19th century views on the human impact 
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18 Quoted in R. Blanchard, “Déboisement et reboisement des préalpes du Sud,” Revue de 
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19 Quoted in Jean-Baptiste Rougier, Les forêts de la France (Paris, A. Bertrand, 1817), 73-4. 
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land clearing and warned that “if we do not put a stop to these degradations, the 
nation of France will become sterile and depopulated.” 20 In his 1806 study of 
hydrology in the department of the Hautes-Alpes, Hericart de Thury was perhaps 
most explicit in the fatal consequences of deforestation.  He observed how the 
locals “have inconsiderately carried the axe and the fire into these forests which 
shade the steep mountains- the ignored source of their riches. Soon were these 
emaciated peaks ravaged by waters, torrents swelled and precipitated 
themselves with fury on the plains; they have cut down, torn away and 
undermined the foundations of the mountains…[N]o obstacle is opposed to their 
fury…[S]oon…torrents will have utterly destroyed all this fine basin…”21 
There is little doubt that the Revolution, in undermining political and social 
order of the Old Regime, also had profound environmental consequences. The 
loss of forest cover and extension of agricultural lands following 1789 has been 
well-documented and many historians have repeated contemporaries’ claims of 
wide-spread environmental degradation.22 Yet, as recent scholarship has pointed 
out, this légende noire of the French Revolution was more mythic than real. 
Forest cover had been under pressure throughout the 18th century from multiple 
sources: naval stores, iron forges, domestic fuel and construction and expansion 
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of land clearance as a result of increasing demographic pressure. 23  Moreover, 
the increase in flooding at the end of the century, while real, is now attributed 
more to climatic changes in rainfall and cooler temperatures than alpine 
deforestation.24 The absorption rates of forests and their effects on hydrological 
regimes, the key conceptual link between deforestation and flooding, has largely 
been discredited by modern ecological science.25  Finally, perhaps the most 
distorting assumption of the era, that deforestation was the result of abusive 
peasant practices, specifically communal pasturage,  has been challenged by 
historians who attribute local populations a far greater ecological sensibility than 
their contemporaries did.26 In mountains of France, deforestation discourse 
turned pastoralism into a public enemy. It became, the historian Serge Briffaud 
notes, “an alibi for a politics of intervention that sought to integrate mountain into 
nation in both economic and social terms.” 27 
Fears of deforestation faded with the passing of the Revolution and over 
the next few decades few efforts were made to address the alpine “problem”. The 
Forest Code of 1827, which sought to regain administrative control of forests 
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eroded during the Revolution, contained several measures to protect alpine 
regions from deforestation, such as banning new land clearances, granting tax 
exemptions to reforested land and authorizing greater surveillance of communal 
lands. While it sparked wide-spread outrage in the Pyrenees, where simmering 
tensions between foresters and locals erupted in the famous “Guerre des 
Desmoiselles” in the 1830s, it did not lead to any comprehensive project of alpine 
reforestation.28 Not until the 1840s, with a resurgence in flooding along the 
nation’s major waterways, would the specter of alpine deforestation again rear its 
head. 
 
 Discovery of a “Pays Catastrophique” 
 
The proximity between the discourse and reality of deforestation was 
closest in the southern Alps. Lower in altitude than their northern brethren, the 
southern Alps were also considerably drier, a consequence of the Mediterranean 
climate, and their limestone and marl slopes were particularly vulnerable to 
erosion from seasonal torrents. For centuries, regional and local bodies had 
issued edicts that forbid the cutting down of trees and limited pasturage, 
clearance and burning.29 The commune of Barcellonette in the Basses-Alpes, for 
instance, had regulations that attempted to protect forests going back to 13th 
century. In 1606, the Parliament of Aix issued a decree that forbid the cutting 
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down of any mature trees on public or private lands and similar acts were passed 
throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.30 Demographic growth throughout much 
of the mountainous Midi in the first half of the nineteenth century had increased 
pressure on local resources and indelibly marked the landscape. In order to 
expand local agriculture, communities were forced to clear new lands on hillsides 
prone to erosion.  
In the eyes of travelers, engineers and administrators in the nineteenth 
century, the southern Alps was the quintessential ruined landscape, emblematic 
of the environmental disorder that ravaged the alpine periphery. According to A. 
Dugied, prefect of the Basses-Alpes department in 1818 and a staunch 
proponent of reforestation, over half the department consisted of unproductive 
lands, a consequence, he believed, of the rampant land clearances unleashed by 
the Revolution. Having denuded the mountain slopes in a vain effort to extend 
agricultural production beyond the narrow confines of the valleys, local 
inhabitants had unwittingly created a catastrophic landscape where torrential 
flooding, landslides and erosion threatened both themselves and their lowland 
compatriots. For Dugied, the natural equilibrium between mountain and plain had 
been disrupted. To restore it, he advocated a series of measures intended to 
regulate the use of alpine space, such as a ban on new land clearances, tax 
breaks and subsidies for landowners willing to reforest their lands and the strict 
regulation of pasturage. Ultimately, the mountain had to be purged of local 
society.  “It is not a question of protecting fields situated along the flanks of our 
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mountains,” Dugied observed. “[F]ar from protecting them, it is desirable that they 
cease to exist.”31  
Dugied’s writings, well-known among department officials and local elites, 
became the basis for the most celebrated text on alpine deforestation of the 19th 
century, Alexandre Surell’s Etude sur les torrents des Hautes-Alpes. Published in 
1841, it became a cornerstone of the reforestation movement, providing a 
“scientific” explanation for the links between deforestation and flooding that had 
long been speculated on by earlier observers.  A recent graduate of the Ecole 
des Ponts-et-Chaussées stationed in Embrun in the Hautes-Alpes, Surell was 
struck by the intensity of flooding and erosion he observed in the upper basin of 
the Durance river which straddled the two departments of the Hautes-Alpes and 
Basses-Alpes. 32 Beginning in high alpine basins which collected both snowmelt 
and rain, torrents flowed down steep gorges, collecting debris along the way, and 
spilled out into the alluvial valleys below where they could cause significant 
damage to the lands and homes of local communities. Surell admitted that the 
frequency and intensity of flooding and erosion in the high Alps was due in part to 
the mix of dry climate with predominant limestone substrate. Yet he was 
convinced that the primary culprit was deforestation: “When one examines the 
regions suffering from torrential flooding, one notes that they are always stripped 
of trees and all brushy vegetation…Wherever there are recent torrents, there are 
no more forests and wherever one has cleared the land of forests torrents have 
formed.” The “beautiful forests” that had once carpeted the valley slopes were 
                                                
31 A. Dugied, Project de boisement des Basses-Alpes (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1819), 50.  
32 “Notice biographique sur Alexandre Surell,” Annales des Ponts-et-Chaussées  (1888). 
 
 46 
“more or less ruined”, exploited by habitants for fuel and the extension of pasture 
and fields and their soils “naked and devoured by torrents.” 33  
Surell’s treatise provided future reboiseurs  with a vision of national 
territory that juxtaposed the plains and mountains in a balancing act of political 
economy. It assumed an ideal grid of territorial space where the productivity of 
each region matched its resources. For Surell, alpine forests were not just a 
powerful deterrent to local flooding; they also represented the future of the 
nation’s woodlands.  The mountains, he believed, were destined to be the final 
sanctuary of the great forests that had been sacrificed for the agricultural and 
industrial output of the nation: 
 
Let us leave the plains to be stripped little by little of their forests so that 
they continue, as in the past, to deliver to us the wheat and sweet fruits of 
their orchards. They are not made for the wild vegetation of forests and we 
would return to the barbarism of ancient Gaul if we compel their lands to 
be covered with sterile trees. But as the forests are effaced from the 
plains, let us lure them to the mountains, where they are the armor as well 
as the ornament and decoration….There is their final refuge against the 
invasions of civilization, which press upon them, pursuing them ax in 
hand, always growing hungrier and more powerful...34 
 
Surell’s call to reforest the French mountains “jusqu’aux crêtes” was 
reinforced by several years of severe flooding in the early 1840s. A governmental 
inquiry established in 1843  dispatched the political economist Adolphe Blanqui 
to the southern Alps to investigate the role alpine deforestation may have played. 
In an impassioned report to the Academy of Science upon his return, Blanqui  
reinforced the bleak picture of environmental ruin painted by Dugied, Surell and 
                                                




others. He presented a tableaux of destruction, from deforested and eroded 
slopes to washed out villages, fields and roads. It was a landscape that conjured 
“images of desolation and death” but also touched his heart and reminded him of 
the duty of the French nation towards its far-flung and often forgotten frontiers: 
“The traveler transported into the midst of these martyred populations would 
hardly believe at times that he was still in France and that the generous heart of 
our nation sends such a weak pulse to these abandoned extremities.” 35 There 
was little time to lose, Blanqui warned, for in fifty years France might be 
separated from Piedmont by a desert that rivaled the Sahara!  
The warnings of Surell, Blanqui and others of the imminent ruin of the 
alpine periphery were quickly overrun by the events of 1848. Urban revolution, 
not rural degradation, became the order of day, as the nation transitioned from 
the July Monarchy to the Second Republic. The confluence of a new emperor 
and new floods in the 1850s, however, would thrust alpine deforestation back 
into public awareness. 
 
The Politics of Reforestation under the Second Empire 
 
By the 1850s, the purported links between catastrophic flooding and 
alpine deforestation were well-established within administrative circles. In the 
wake of the 1856 floods, the parliamentary commission in charge of flood relief 
aid clearly indicated the human causes of this “natural” disaster:  
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Is it not permissible to ask if civilization, whose demands have at times 
been satisfied beyond the limits of prudence, has not itself contributed to 
these disturbances? The forests which cover the summit and flanks of our 
mountains and which prevent rain waters from arriving too quickly in 
brooks and rivers, have for the most part disappeared.36 
 
The beneficial effects of forests for the nation became, for a brief time, a 
fashionable topic in the popular press.  A 1859 article in the Revue des Deux-
Mondes celebrated forests as a cure-all for every conceivable ill afflicting French 
territory: “Not only would [alpine reforestation] put an end to flooding forever, but 
it would provoke more rain in arid climates, diminish it humid climates, protect 
both from dangerous winds, stabilize temperatures, regulate water flow, suppress 
marshes, ensure public health and protect us from foreign invasions.”37 
This predisposition to view the floods as a consequence of deforestation 
did not mean that there was a consensus on how to respond. Leading up to the 
1860 law, state engineers and foresters jockeyed over which administration, the 
Ponts-et-Chaussées or Eaux-et-Forêt, was better suited to deal with the problem 
of flood control. Despite the rapid ascension of Surell’s text to sacred status 
among foresters, many engineers remained skeptical of the link between flooding 
and deforestation. One engineer went so far, in an address to the Academy of 
Science in 1857, to argue forests promoted rather than retarded floods, acting 
less like a sponge than a giant umbrella!38 This reluctance to embrace 
deforestation discourse reflected the institutional role of the Administration within 
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the French state.  As the traditional guardians of the nation’s waterways, Ponts-
et-Chaussées engineers focused primarily on the construction of downstream 
dikes and embankments. If reforestation became the new form of flood control, it 
would mean the drying up of state funds for these projects. During the 1850s, 
there was growing sentiment, not least from the Emperor, that the Administration 
should extend its activities upstream, building dams, reservoirs and 
embankments along the upper reaches of tributaries.39 Flush with expanded 
powers and increased funds after the floods, the Administration had an 
opportunity to alter its flood control policies. Instead, responding to public 
pressure, it concentrated its efforts on the repairing of dikes around important 
provincial cities and towns. Lyon, Arles, Avignon and Tarascon along the Rhone 
and Lyon, Nevers, Blois, Angers and Tours along the Loire were the main 
beneficiaries of this frenzy of public works. 40 For Ponts-et-Chaussées engineers, 
protection downstream won out over prevention upstream.  
Engineers found their hydraulic authority challenged by the growing 
number of reforestation proponents.  State foresters emphasized the unique 
conditions of alpine regions to assert their expertise as managers of natural risk 
and the legitimate caretakers of the mountain. In 1853, a conservateur des forêts 
for Grenoble, M. Hun, invoked Surell’s distinction between mountains and plains 
to illustrate the proper horizons of each administration in regards to the problem 
of torrential flooding. While the purview of engineers, he wrote, should be the 
“rich and populous valleys” where the expense of technical works “is not out of 
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proportion with the value of properties to be protected”, foresters were best 
suited for the work in the mountains where restoration efforts focused on the 
regeneration of plant life, modest technical works and the surveillance of local 
populations.41 Though an engineer himself, Surell, too, had noted that engineers 
seemed ill-equipped to deal with the problem of alpine torrents: “passive” 
engineering works, he thought, were no match for the “active” power of forests.42  
The relief aid commission established after the 1856 floods could not help but 
speculate on whether the system of dikes established by Ponts-et-Chaussées 
engineers in fact contributed to the floods: “In the end, have not dikes 
themselves, public or private… narrowed the channels of rivers and aggravated 
the dangers that they were designed to prevent?”43  
The law of 1860 marked a decisive victory for the Forestry Administration 
and its conceptions of risk and resource management.  The appeal of 
reforestation had much to do with cost.  In contrast to the hundreds of millions of 
francs estimated by engineers for a system of alpine flood control, the first 
decade of reforestation cost the state a mere ten million francs. While it granted 
the Forestry Administration broader powers of intervention, the law clearly did not 
foresee huge public expenditures. With such a limited budget, the law proposed 
a carrot and stick approach to regenerating alpine forests. The first three articles 
attempted to entice local communities and individuals to reforest their lands, 
which the law defined as travaux facultatifs, through an array of subsidies in the 
form of seeds, cash, and tax exemption. If local initiative failed to materialize, 
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articles 4 through 6 authorized the state to undertake mandatory reforestation or 
travaux obligatoires in designated areas where the dangers of flooding or extent 
of deforestation were deemed a threat to the public good. The costs of these 
projects would have to be reimbursed through either payment or cession of lands 
within a given time period.44 
Historians have tended to view the law as an illustration of the coercive 
and authoritarian power of the Second Empire state.  Specifically, they point to 
the provisions of expropriation granted to forestry agents whereby local property 
owners as and communes could be forced to cede portions of their land to the 
state if they were deemed a “public” threat. By extending the principles of public 
utility and expropriation already well-established in matters of public works to 
reforestation projects, the law provided the state with greater powers of 
intervention into local resource management.45  
In many ways, however, the 1860 law was inspired as much by caution 
and compromise as coercion. From the very beginning, political and financial 
considerations made it clear that a successful policy of alpine reforestation would 
require the support of local populations. With the specter of the 1848 uprisings 
fresh in their minds, many legislators were wary of establishing any legal 
precedent that imposed collective interests over individual rights, particularly 
property rights. There was considerable debate within the special commission 
assigned to study the project over the precise limits of state intervention. 
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According to the key drafter of the law, Eugèn Chevandier de Valdrôme, many 
members voiced fears that the basic rights of private property would be 
subverted by a law that, in its extreme form, came dangerously close to the 
socialist excesses of 1848.46  State foresters were often exasperated by the 
cautious approach of legislators. Their “repugnance” of the principle of 
expropriation, the Director of Forestry Administration Louis-Henri Vicaire 
lamented, hamstrung reforestation efforts by depriving local forestry agents of the 
threat of coercion.47 He was right. During the first two decades of state 
reforestation, recourse to expropriation was rare, accounting for only one percent 
of perimeters. 48 
The coercive elements of the 1860 law were also tempered by a general 
sentiment that the provocation of local populations was counter-productive to the 
goals of reforestation. In an 1861 circular to the prefects of targeted departments, 
the Minister of Finance underlined the importance of local support: 
It is vital that all necessary measures be taken to ensure that the operation 
of reforestation is accepted by the people. In the mountains regions, 
pastoral traditions will have difficulty reconciling with reforestation which 
requires the suppression of over-grazing and the restriction of pasturage. 
Increasing the productivity of pasturage while proceeding, on the other 
hand, with the work of reforestation would be, in my view, the most 
effective way to satisfy all parties.49 
 
As Vicaire himself pointed out, while the threat of coercion was important, 
actual recourse to expropriation and mandatory forestation should be a last 
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resort. It risked not only inflaming local opinion but also bloating the forestry 
budget beyond its limits. The ten million francs allocated for its budget paled in 
comparison with the credits supplied to the Emperor’s primary concerns, railways 
and the reconstruction of Paris. Even the scaled-down ambitions of the final law, 
which had a more practical goal of reforesting 100,000 hectares, could not 
possibly be met with an expenditure of a mere 100 francs per hectare. 50 
Furthermore, attempts to provide incentives for reforestation were crippled by the 
lack of investment interests that served as the engine of other territorial 
improvement schemes. Alpine forests were not, by and large, destined for timber 
and paper production. Indeed, the productivist logic that lay at the heart of 
forestry science- where trees became measurable and, hence, controllable 
commodities free of customary and local attachments- was ill-equipped to 
address the problem of alpine deforestation.51 To permit the state to undertake 
the works, as the 1860 law planned, would leave communes in the unenviable 
position of having to reimburse the state, with an average of 5% annual interest, 
in order to recover the use of their lands, or face the loss of 1/2 of their reforested 
lands or 1/4 of their regenerated pasturage. “Is it any wonder,” a 1869 report from 
Society of Agriculture asked, “that the bill, when received, would not be accepted 
graciously?” 52 Coercion, it seemed, was simply too expensive.  
                                                
50  Vicaire, Le Moniteur Universel, 20 February 1864. 
51 In this sense, alpine reforestation differed significantly from the German “scientific” forestry 
identified by James Scott as a key tactic of state control. James C. Scott, Seeing like a state, 11-
22. 
52 Quoted in P. Chevallier and M.-J. Couailhac,  L'Administration des Eaux et Forêts dans le 
département de l'Isère au XIXe siècle: sauvegard et reconstitution du patrimoine (Grenoble, 
CRHESI, 1983),  84. 
 
 54 
To gain local support, which Vicaire and others acknowledged was 
essential, the state had to appeal not to material gains as much as a collective 
sense of responsibility towards the ‘public good’. The task that lay before the 
Forestry administration, Vicaire would later write, was to convince local 
populations to see themselves as part of the public interest that was being 
claimed: “The works of reforestation being destined in part to preserve the 
valleys from the dangers of flooding, the inhabitants of the upper reaches of the 
mountains ask, not without some foundation, why one would impose on them the 
privations without compensations for improvements the fruits of which the lower 
valleys would reap.”53  For alpine communities, forests were not abstract 
resources destined to serve a distant and elusive ‘public good’ but rather integral 
components of an agro-pastoral landscape. 
 
 Disciplining the Mountain: Reforestation perimeters and local society  
  
The initial results of the reforestation campaign were mixed. State forestry 
agents found some success, at least early on, convincing landowners to 
undertake voluntary reforestation with the help of subsidies. Three years into the 
campaign, an estimated 29,000 hectares had been reforested, mainly in the 
Massifs Centrals and Alps. The departments of Puy-de-Dôme and the Vaucluse 
were particularly active, accounting for nearly 20% of all reforested lands 
between 1862 and 1874. 54 Visiting the Luberon region in the Vaucluse in 1864, 
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the Director of Forests Vicaire marveled at the transformation of 800 hectares of 
previously barren rock and scrub into a fledgling forest of hardy Aleppo pines. 
“To he who has seen the seedlings of the Luberon”, Vicaire enthused, “no 
reforestation should appear impossible.”55  
Forestry agents, however, could not conceal the widespread rejection of 
communes to reforestation. The enquête agricole of 1866 reflected the general 
tenor of local populations in the southern Alps towards reforestation. The 
representative from Sisteron, a colonel Réguis, firmly declared that the “demands 
of the Forestry administration have been the cause of all the ‘popular emotions’ 
of late in the region” while an Inspector of Forests at Digne was forced to admit 
that “reforestation is not popular in the mountains.”56 Accounts of popular 
manifestations, nurseries and plantations being raided and destroyed, forestry 
guards and workers threatened and structures attacked were not uncommon. In 
April 1864 locals destroyed plantations and threatened reforestation worker in the 
communes of Orres and St. Saveur in the department of the Hautes-Alpes in 
1864, not far from where Surell had composed his reforestation manifesto.  
Violent confrontations, however, were relatively rare, in stark contrast to the 
turbulent years following the establishment of the Forest Code. 57  
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By far the most common encounters between foresters and locals 
occurred over the creation of reforestation perimeters. It was here where the 
efforts of the state to inscribe a new disciplinary space of conservation onto local 
environments were most evident. As the first and most important step in the 
reforestation process for a given area, the creation of a perimeter followed a 
carefully prescribed script.  Once they identified an active torrent, forestry agents 
would trace a ‘conservation zone’ or zone de défense around it, encompassing 
its basin, channel and mouth and extending around each secondary and even 
tertiary torrent. Because of their finger-like extension, the zones around adjacent 
torrents knit together into a fairly continuous perimeter, frequently abutting 
perimeters in other communes. The goal of this structure was to consolidate 
reforestation efforts, which was as much a protective as an economizing 
measure. Dispersed perimeters required more surveillance and there were never 
enough forestry agents to go around. 58 Once a reforestation perimeter was 
determined by forestry agents, it had to pass through a gauntlet of municipal 
councils, arrondissement councils, general councils and departmental 
commissions and prefects before it was authorized by the Conseil d’Etat.   
The most charged part of this process was the presentation of the 
proposed perimeters to the municipal council which held an inquiry of its own to 
establish the view of the commune. The prefect frequently called on the justice of 
the peace to lead the inquiry in the hopes that he would be in the best position to 
convince local populations of the public utility of the project. In 1864, the prefect 
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of Isère wrote the justice of the peace in Clelles, requesting him to oversee the 
inquiry, explaining that “[s]uch projects are not always well-understood by our 
alpine populations and generate among them apprehensions or fears that would 
be wise to dissipate as soon as possible.”59 Officials were right to be concerned. 
Only one of the 264 reforestation perimeters encompassing 140,600 hectares 
created by 1864 was approved by a municipal council.60 
While an unfavorable response by the municipal council could not block 
the authorization of mandatory reforestation- they enjoyed only the right of 
consultation- communes had other means of resistance. Mayors and municipal 
councils frequently turned the bureaucracy of reforestation to their advantage,  
dragging the process out by stalling, failing to submit or sign required documents, 
refusing to post notices of expropriation.61 A favorite tactic was impeding 
perimeter surveys by withholding, or at least not making readily available, 
records of property lines, always notoriously difficult to pin down. Foresters 
complained of having to spend countless hours rummaging through departmental 
archives in search of property records. 62  
 
The “Ruined” Commons: Pasturage, property, and the public good 
 
The wide-spread rejection of reforestation perimeters by local 
communities stemmed from one basic truth: they removed valuable pasture from 
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the local economy. As it had been in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
key source of friction between state agents and local inhabitants was the viability 
of the collective property regime to manage local resources. For proponents of 
reforestation, extensive sheepherding was inimical to healthy forests. Surell and 
Blanqui had both singled out communal pasturage as the most glaring human 
contribution to deforestation. The over-grazing of alpine pastures, they argued, 
led inevitably to reduced tree and grass cover, increased erosion and, ultimately, 
torrential flooding. While local sheep herds contributed to this environmental 
degradation, migrating or transhumant herds were considered the real threat. 
Local municipal councils, desperate for additional revenue, were too profligate 
with their leases, allowing provençal herds during the summer months to overrun 
the mountains like swarms of locusts. M.A. Mathieu, a professor of natural history 
at the Ecole forestière who toured reforestation perimeters in the southern Alps in 
1864, highlighted the abuses of communal property by comparing it with the 
virtues of private property: “Private property has typically been exploited with 
moderation and foresight and wherever it is sufficiently developed, the land 
assumes a cheerful aspect.” In contrast, communal property “has been 
devastated through abuse…[and] [w]e now understand not only the vicious 
exploitation of communal property but also the extent of the disasters it 
occasions.”63  By disrupting the equilibrium between mountain and plain through 
abusive pasturage and deforestation, local communities had unleashed upon 
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both themselves and the downstream public the plague of erosion and 
catastrophic flooding. 
The lens of local abuse that colored much of the reforestation campaign 
made it difficult to attribute what one today might call “ecological rationality” to 
montagnards. Though varying from region to region, even valley to valley, alpine 
economies depended on the symbiotic relationship between cultivation and 
husbandry. In this agro-pastoral order, communities maximized agricultural 
production from the relatively poor soils of valley and terrace through the 
intensive application of manure collected from their livestock. Sheep were the 
preferred agents of excrement as they were both highly mobile, able to reach 
distant mountain pastures, and could survive on the meager sustenance they 
found there. Without the fertilizer provided by the herds, the cultivation of 
subsistence grain crops in these harsh climates was unsustainable.64 
Communal pasturage was the key resource in these local economies.65 
The seasonal migration of sheep from cultivated valley to upland pasture, known 
as estivage, was essential in environments where scarce arable land made the 
production of forage difficult. Between valley and alpine pasture lay the 
intermediate slopes that provided the crucial seasonal resources of spring and 
fall pasturage, before and after the access to summer pasturage. A vital resource 
in the local subsistence economy, communal pasturage was also integrated in 
the market economy.  Landowners and communes could reap significant rents 
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from leasing summer pasturage to the great migrating herds of the southern 
French plains. The seasonal movement or transhumance of sheep helped link 
together plains and mountains in Mediterranean France. Until well into the 19th 
century, the ancient patterns of transhumance had changed very little. Torrid 
summer heat and aridity drove the herds from Bas-Languedoc, Rousillon and, 
above all, Provence into alpine pastures green from the spring-melt. Each 
summer, the ancient paths know as drailles or carraïres became busy with the 
traffic of scabots, large herds of 500 to 2000 sheep, goats and mules. The 
isolation of alpine communities well into the 19th century ensured that they 
remain wed to their traditional methods of production. As long as fertilizer was 
too costly to import and grains too costly to export, there was little chance local 
communities would turn away from their dependence on subsistence agriculture 
and communal pasturage.66 
The bias against local society embedded in deforestation discourse was 
not lost on some interested observers. Zéphyrin Jouyne, a wealthy property 
owner and member of the Société d’Agriculture in the Basses-Alpes, criticized 
what he saw as the erasure of local inhabitants in official representations of the 
ruined mountain. Catching wind of the proposed law on reforestation following 
the report of Blanqui,  Jouyne had condemned it as an outright assault on local 
alpine economies which threatened to deprive “communes of their mountains” by 
submitting pasturage to the regulation of the Forestry Administration. Blinded by 
a “northern” vision of productive plains and cattle pasturage, visitors to the Alps 
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failed to perceive the logic of agro-pastoral practices.67 As fellow southern and  
critic of reforestation, Charles de Ribbe, pointed out, the Forestry Administration 
had “confused the Midi for North”, only able to see the southern mountain in 
terms of the northern plain.68 
Though it certainly structured perceptions of the alpine landscape, the 
prejudice against collective property common among reforestation proponents 
did not entirely blind them to the realities of local society.  The harsh 
condemnation of alpine peasants was tempered by the acknowledgement of their 
poverty, isolation and desperation. Surell understood the central economic 
function of pasturage in the sparse and relatively infertile alpine region. Though 
sheep posed a direct threat to the future of alpine forests, the question was not 
one of elimination but regulation, “of proportioning them to the actual resources 
of the region.”69 Blanqui, too, was reluctant to attribute local abuse to mere 
ignorance and irrationality, viewing the problem as a vicious circle propelled by 
poverty and insecurity. 70  
The rhetoric concerning the evils of pasturage  tended to outstrip actual 
practices. In his tour of reforestation sites shortly after the passage of the 1860 
law, Director of Forest Vicaire stressed to prefects and foresters the importance 
of alpine pasturage to local communities. For reforestation policies to succeed, 
they had to be combined with efforts to regenerate degraded pasture, if only as a 
                                                
67 Z. Jouyne, Reboisement des Montagnes (1850), quoted in D. Ponchelet, “Le débat autour du 
déboisement dans le département des Basses-Alpes, France,” Revue de Géographie alpine 1 
(1995), 61. 
68 Charles de Ribbe, La Provence au point de vue de bois, des torrents et des inondations avant 
et après 1789 (Paris, 1857), 32. 
69 Surell, Etude sur les torrents, 217 
70D. Ponchelet, “Le débat autour du déboisement,” 57-8. 
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tactic to “render alpine populations sympathetic to the operation of 
reforestation.”71 He reminded foresters that they should choose their sites 
carefully, avoiding areas where stiff resistance was expected: “The work of 
reforestation being unable to succeed unless it obtains the sympathies of local 
populations, one must not pass up any opportunity that might lead towards this 
goal.”72 Vicaire’s concern that reforestation policies account for local pasturage 
interests was echoed by a forestry agent at Nîmes, who conceded in a report to 
his superior that “pasturage is a vital question in the Midi. Far from attacking it, 
we must enlarge it as much as possible…It is important to prove to local 
populations that silviculture and agriculture, far from harming each other, can 
help each other attain the common goal of maximizing the production of the 
land.”73 
 In 1864 the Corps legislatif, following the prescriptions of Vicaire, passed 
a law authorizing the substitution of reforestation with the regeneration or 
regazonnement of pasturage in certain instances. In situations where the state 
undertook the restoration works, the property owner, individual or commune, 
could pay off their debt through the cession of one-quarter rather than one-half of 
their property. In addition, funds were made available for communes as 
indemnities for the restriction of pasturage rights for given amount of time. 74 
An attempt to better calibrate reforestation to local conditions and avoid 
conflict, the law on regazonnement proved largely ineffectual. The regeneration 
                                                
71 Quoted in Fourchy, “Un Centenaire Oublié,” 33. 
72Ibid., 31 
73 Quoted in Fesquet, “Un corps quasi-militaire,” 450-1. 
74 Fourchy, “Un Centenaire Oublié,” 36.  
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of pasturage, like reforestation, required the long-term restriction of pasturage 
and hence was unlikely to appear any more attractive to local communities.   
Deforestation discourse alternated between two different temporal registers, the 
imminence of catastrophe and the long durée of environmental repair. The 
timetables that foresters forecasted for regeneration had nothing to do with the 
lived time of locals. While 5 or 10 years of pasturage restrictions may have 
seemed a small price to pay for repairing what they viewed as catastrophic 
landscapes, it demonstrated a singular ignorance, if not contempt, for local 
realities. The dilemma was described in striking clarity by a Ponts-et-Chaussées 
engineer posted in the Basses-Alpes: “[T]he inhabitants understand the utility of 
reforestation for preventing future calamities caused by torrential flooding but 
what they understand even more clearly and which is most evident to them is 
that reforestation is a long-term undertaking which will bar them from the majority 
of their pasturage…The future affects them less than the present and the present 
for them is ruinous if they do not have unrestricted access to their pasturage.” 75   
 Some foresters observed, somewhat wryly, that  locals frequently used 
the new law as pretext for further resistance to any interference by the state. In 
the perimeter of Faucon in the Basses-Alpes, for instance, it was lamented that 
locals wielded the new law  “like a weapon against reforestation.”76 When in 1868 
a revised plan for the perimeter was proposed to the municipal council, 
subtracting 584 hectares from reforestation in favor of pasturage improvement, 
                                                
75 AN F10 2315, Chief Engineer of the Basses-Alpes, “Résultats de la statistique des cours 
d’eau,” 18 January 1862. 
76 Reboisement des montagnes. Compte rendu des travaux de 1869 à 1874 (Paris: Imprimerie 
nationale, 1875), 5. 
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which accounted for nearly 85% of the total perimeter, the council rejected it. As 
the Forestry report notes, this hardly demonstrated any local sympathy for the 
work of reforestation but rather the “hope, nourished by a handful of leaders” that 
it would succeed in having the entire lot removed from the perimeter and the 
declaration of public utility revoked.77  
Efforts to incorporate pasturage into visions of alpine regeneration hinted 
at the weak underbelly of all reforestation efforts. The project of alpine 
reforestation had set itself the difficult task of trying to ‘rationalize’ local users and 
their environments through appeals to a conception of the public that effectively 
erased them from the equation. By removing land both from the subsistence 
agro-pastoral economy and the limited cash economy of transhumant pasturage, 
reforestation perimeters essentially evacuated the local from the mountainside. 
Given the close relation between pasturage and local subsistence and income, it 
is hardly surprising that local alpine populations regarded reforestation efforts 




The project of alpine restoration begun under the Second Empire was one 
the most ambitious attempts at environmental engineering of the nineteenth 
century. It rested on a notion of degradation that attributed recent deforestation 
and its presumed consequence, catastrophic flooding, to irrational local practices 
of land clearance and communal pasturage.  While this discourse of 
                                                
77 Ibid., 6. 
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deforestation became a powerful means by which the state sought to incorporate 
the mountain into its vision of a rationalized national territory, it failed to garner 
the support of local inhabitants, for whom pasturage rights were an essential 
feature of both the local economy and their status as citizens of the nation.   
However, to dismiss alpine reforestation as merely a technology of 
environmental control is to lose sight of the more subtle negotiations that went on 
between state and local society. In particular, by casting alpine forests as an 
instrument of the public good, state agents, perhaps in spite of themselves, 
opened up a dialogue between periphery and center over the proper 
management of natural resources that, in truth, were both local and national.  
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The Landes was arguably the most famous “invented” landscape of 
nineteenth-century France1. Alongside the project of alpine restoration, the 
creation of the Landais forests stood as the Second Empire’s most ambitious 
attempt at environmental transformation. In 1857, the Corps Législatif passed a 
law on the “regeneration” of the Landes. Part of the Second Empire’s aggressive 
campaign to rationalize national territory, it ordered privatization, drainage and 
forestation of 300,000 hectares or more than 1100 square miles of communal 
pasturage and subsidized a major rail line and hundreds of kilometers of rural 
roads. For many, it symbolized the victory of an enlightened state over a sterile 
wasteland. The Landes was nature’s rebuke of the French nation, “a kind of 
domestic Sahara that distresses and fatigues all the voyagers who travel through 
the south of France.”2 The law, one député extolled, offered “ a precious 
                                                
1 To avoid confusion, the terms  “Landes” (italicized) refers to the region known as the Landes de 
Gascogne whereas the “Landes” (not italicized) refers to the department. The “landes” (lower-
case, italicized) refers to the communal moors, namesake of the region.  
2 Quoted in Jules Chambrelent, Les landes de Gascogne, leur assainissement, leur mise en 
culture, exploitation et débouchés de leurs produits (Paris, 1887),  22. Colonial analogies were 
frequent in descriptions of the Landes and proved remarkably durable. A traveler in 1911 
commented how “interesting it would be recount the history of this portion of France long-
considered our African Sahara…[Especially] for those committed to our North African 
 
 67 
conquest…ten times greater than Algeria.”3 In his speech welcoming the 
Emperor to the region in 1857, Charles Corta, député of the Landes, praised his 
“peaceful conquest of an interior colony.” In several years, he predicted, “the 
desolate aridity of deserts that Your Majesty just crossed will become…by the 
cultivation and spread of the rich forests, with their deep roots and powerful 
limbs, the symbol of the Napoleon dynasty in France!”4  The plaque planted at 
the entrance to the imperial estate of Solférino, established in 1857 as a ‘model’ 
farm in the midst of the Landes, testified to the regime’s ideology of benign 
conquest.5 Below the imprint of the Emperor’s boot, an inscription read: “To 
Napoléon III, the first sovereign to step foot on this arid land to improve and 
regenerate it.”6  In the Landes, the march towards civilization was through the 
wasteland.  
Regional historians have challenged this legacy of state intervention. In 
1949 Roger Sargos published an exhaustive history of the Landais forests.7 A 
forester and prominent landowner in the region, Sargos argued that the role of 
the French state in the transformation of the region was more mythical than real, 
the product of political fantasy and rhetoric that portrayed the state (both imperial 
                                                                                                                                            
possessions, it would be a source of great interest and an encouraging lesson.” J.-H  Ricard, Au 
Pays landais (Paris, 1911), 11.  
3 Quoted in Dominique d’Antin de Vaillac,  L’Invention des Landes: L’Etat français et les territoires 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 151.  
4 Archives départementales des Landes (hereafter ADL) 1M 358, Journal des Landes, 27 August 
1857. 
5 Tellingly, the estate was named after one of great battles of the imperial army during its 
campaign in the Italian states.  
6 ADL 1M 358, Journal des Landes, August 27, 1857. It is interesting to note the symbolic 
association here with the rois thaumaturges or ‘healing kings’ of the medieval and early modern 
period. While they claimed the power to heal the terrible skin disease known as scrofula through 
the ‘royal touch’, Napoleon III claimed the power to heal the sick wastelands (whose inhabitants 
were famously afflicted with high rates of malaria  and scrofula ) through the ‘imperial boot’.  




and republican) as the great savior of the Landes. The real heroes in this story, 
according to Sargos, were the Landais themselves, who had patiently improved 
the land through drainage and forestation for generations prior to the appearance 
of an eager state.  State intervention not only drew on models of local 
management that it did not acknowledge, but it also claimed success for a 
transformation already underway. “The Landais forest,” Sargos declared, “ is not 
the ‘creation of state power’ but the result of the effort and thrift of 8 to 10 
generations of landowning peasants.”8 Subsequent histories of the Landes have, 
to greater or lesser degrees, picked up where Sargos left off, excavating the 
region’s history from the rubble of national myths. 9  As the historian Jacques 
Sargos, Roger Sargos’s grandson, writes, “[t]he celebration of a glorious 
conquest, of a victory over the primitive world, has, until recently, obscured the 
existence and role of local society. It is hardly the Landais themselves that one 
needs to decolonize but rather their memory.”10 
This chapter argues that the opposition between state and local society 
that appears in both official and revisionist narratives of the region obscures their 
fluid and reciprocal relationship.11 The transformation of the Landes was a 
function of appropriation and collaboration as much as confrontation and 
                                                
8 Roger Sargos, Plan de sauvegarde de la forêt landais et de remise en valeur des Landes de 
Gascogne (Bordeaux: Delmas, 1949),  1. 
9 Among key works on the Landes, see J. Sargos, Histoire de la forêt landaise; Jean Cailluyer, 
Regards sur l'histoire sociale des Landes (Toulouse: Eché, 1983); Louis Papy, Les Landes de 
Gascogne et le Côte d'Argent (Toulouse, 1978); Charles Bouchet, Lugos, commune des Landes 
de Gascogne; and Bernard Manciet,  Le triangle des Landes (Paris: Arthaud, 1981).  
10 J. Sargos, Histoire de la forêt landaise, 71.  
11 Several recent works on the Landes have, to varying degrees, broken free of this local-state 
dichotomy. See Alice Garner,  A Shifting Shore: Locals, outsiders, and the transformation of a 
French fishing town, 1823-2000 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) and Dominique d’Antin 
de Vaillac,  L’Invention des Landes. 
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coercion. As an uncertain instrument of social and environmental change, subject 
to local re- calibration and resistance, forestation in the Landes illustrates the 
negotiated path of modernization at the periphery. State intervention and local 
invention were bound together, each shaping the contours and horizons of the 
other. They were, to borrow Timothy Mitchell’s terminology, less a cause of 
transformation than its “effect”, the outcome of material and discursive 
exchanges among multiple groups as they sought to shape the outcomes of 
forestation.12  
Property relations were critical sites in the negotiation of environmental 
claims in the Landes. The rapid transformation of a largely agro-pastoral and 
subsistence economy into a highly-regimented capitalist economy of resin and 
timber production entailed the radical re-ordering of social, spatial and 
environmental orders, often in unpredictable ways. The fulcrum of this headlong 
rush into modernity was the privatization of the vast communal moors. This 
abrupt shift in property relations became the crucial interface between state and 
local society in the Landes as groups struggled to control the economic, social 
and environmental implications of forestation.  
A deep suspicion of the commons informed both the justification and the 
course of state intervention in the Landes. In vogue since the eighteenth century, 
                                                
12 As Mitchell writes, “[t]he line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity, 
which can be thought of as a free-standing object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, within the 
network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is 
maintained.” Yet, he points out, this  ‘difference’ between state and society in no less real for 
being produced: “[P]roducing and maintaining the distinction between state and society is itself a 
mechanism that generates resources of power.” Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: 
Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 
(1991): 90. For an extended discussion of the relationship between culture and state-making, see 
State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
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critiques of the collective property regime became a rallying cry for the 
transformation of a landscape dominated by communal moors. Proponents of 
forestation depicted the region as sterile, insalubrious and backward, legitimizing 
state intervention in the name of privatization and progress. As in the case of 
alpine reforestation, this idea of the “catastrophic” commons constituted a 
narrative of environmental degradation that recast the Landes as a wasteland in 
need of redemption.  
In the Landes, however, the discourse of property rights that initially united 
the state and local elites in the project of forestation proved unstable. New lines 
of fracture developed as local landowners and investors eventually broke with 
state engineers and officials over the problem of the collective management of 
private forests. The small farmers, sharecroppers and shepherds that made up 
the bulk of rural society also began to resist the appropriation of communal lands 
by local elites, defending the collective rights of pasturage that underpinned the 
agro-pastoral economy against privatization. Property claims, it seemed, served 
many masters. While they could be marshaled around the project of national 
integration and economic modernization, they also facilitated the expression (and 
even re-invention) of local identity and belonging.13 
 
Les Landes: Narrating marginality 
 
                                                
13 On the narrative qualities of property ownership and the different ways it can be appropriated 
by social groups, see Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory 
and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 11-45.  For an anthropological 
approach to property ownership as a “language” of locality, see Jaro Stacul, The Bounded Field: 
Localism and Local Identity in an Italian Alpine Valley  (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 54-62. 
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At first glance, the Landes de Gascogne appeared an unlikely candidate 
for state intervention. A triangular region bordered by the Atlantic ocean in the 
west and the Gironde and Adour rivers in the east, it straddles three 
departments: the Landes, the Gironde and the western edge of the Lot-et-
Garonne.  Along its perimeter, the Landes appeared much the same as other 
rural regions in France. Agricultural lands, vineyards and forests clustered 
around its major waterways and western coast. Yet it owed its name, and 
reputation, to the vast moors or landes that occupied much of its center, the aptly 
named Grande Lande (or Lana Gran in Gascon). The generally flat terrain, a 
product of marine and alluvial deposits since the Miocene, provided little natural 
drainage. During the rainy fall and winter months, much of the Landes became 
sodden and impassable, its few roads transformed into quagmires. Outside of the 
few larger towns such as Dax and Mont-de-marsan, a sparse agro-pastoral 
society characterized much of the region. Most rural inhabitants depended on 
subsistence crops of rye, millet, wheat and corn that, in turn, depended on the 
fertilizer collected from extensive sheep pasturage on communal landes. Locals 
practiced a form of transhumance that followed the rhythm of the seasons. In the 
wetter months, the flocks grazed on the prairies and fields that encircled the 
farms. When the summer heat came, the sheep were led out to the great 
communal moors to pasture.14  
 
 
                                                
14 Annie Pinaud, "L'occupation du sol dans la Grande Lande au début du XIXe siècle," in La 
Grande Lande. Histoire naturelle et géographie historique, edited by A. Klingebiel and J.-B. 
Marquette (Paris: CNRS, 1981), 305-314. 
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The productive logic of this agro-pastoral landscape rarely registered to 
outside observers. In travel narratives, investment brochures and administrative 
reports, the Landes flickered as a phantasm of exotic desolation. Its seasonal 
extremes-now scorched, now submerged- lent it a surreal and liminal quality. At 
times it was likened to the great Sahara, a burning wasteland of shimmering 
mirages and endless horizons.15 Its features struck observers as distinctly un-
                                                
15 Bernard Traimond, “Mythologie de l'Aménagement des Landes,” in Milieu naturel, techniques, 
rapports sociaux,  ed. C. Raynaud (Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1983), 39-47. 
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French,  “a desert where the Gallic cock could only sharpen its claws.”16 
According to one astonished visitor in 1837, the Landes “was as unknown as the 
deserts of Kamchaka or the sands of Libya.”17 At other times, the region 
appeared as a foul marshland. One agricultural company in 1822 reasoned that, 
since the communal moors were of a marine rather than terrestrial nature, they 
belonged to the public domain and could be sold to private investors by the 
state!18 
Local inhabitants, like their landscapes, struck observers as strange and 
otherworldly, particularly the pasteurs or shepherds who roamed the communal 
moors.  If the Landes was the ‘Sahara de l’Aquitaine’, the pasteur was its 
“Bédouin.”19 Clad in sheepskins and astride stilts that facilitated travel over the 
marshy landes, the pasteurs could inspire curiosity, wonder or disgust. One 
often-cited travelogue from the 18th century exclaimed over their remarkable form 
of locomotion: “They make use of prodigiously long stilts…[yet] the agility of their 
gate is astonishing; a horse at trot could not follow them.”20 For some, the 
pasteurs symbolized the degraded nature of the Landes itself. One observer 
described them as “cruel, barbarous and without pity…[the] missing link long 
searched for between man and monkey.”21  On the eve of forestation, a traveler 
in 1857 remarked that “the half-savage race that stagnates in this desert blends 
                                                
16 Ricard, Au Pays landais, 11. 
17 Vicomte d’ Yzarn Freissinet, Coup d’oeil sur les Landes de Gascogne (Paris, 1837), 15. 
18 Jacques Sargos, Histoire de la forêt landaise, 92. 
19 Anne-Marie Cocula, "Le Landais au XIXe siècle, ou l'homme prétendu quadrumane." In Milieux 
naturels et identités culturelles, edited by Andrée Corvol (Paris: CNRS, 1993), 53-56. 
20 Jacques Grasset Saint-Sauveur, Les Landes de Bordeaux. Moeurs et usages de leurs 
habitants. Suivi de Voyage dans le département des Landes, par Joseph Lavallée (Paris: Editions 
Ultreia, 1988),  59. 
21 Quoted in Jean-Pierre Lescarret, “Parcs, bordes, parcours et bergers dans la Grande-Lande au 
temps de l’agro-pastoralisme,” Bulletin de la Société de Borda 123 (1998), 160. 
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tragically, through his scrawniness, his weakness and sickly pallor, with the harsh 
appearance of the Landes.”22  
 
Figure 3. Shepherds of the Landes  
 
Perceptions of the Landes as a ruined wasteland owed much to 
Enlightenment conceptions of nature and property. For 18th century agronomists 
and physiocrats, cultivated nature represented the main source of national 
                                                
22  Mary-Lafon, "Coup d'oeil sur les Landes en Chemin de Fer." Revue d'Aquitaine et du 
Languedoc  2 (1857-8): 538-541. 
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wealth. 23  Temperate plains and valleys where agriculture flourished were not 
only beautiful but productive, reflecting society’s conquest over brute nature. 24  
Cereal crops, vineyards and prairies were landscapes of reason. Unproductive 
lands, in contrast, were considered ugly, frightening and dangerous. Forests, 
mountains and marshlands posed a threat to the rational ordering of landscape. 
25 The Landes, with its great swaths of unimproved moor, certainly appeared to 
most observers as representing this ‘anti-nature’.  
Negative attitudes towards the commons reinforced the wasteland image. 
In the Landes, officials blamed the communal regime for its degraded landscape. 
Baron d’Haussez, a prefect of both the Landes and the Gironde during his 
career, regarded the communal moors as the single greatest obstacle to 
progress in the region. Writing in 1826, he denounced the “deplorable collective 
regime, last vestige of centuries of barbarism, which still enslaves these 
immense plains.” By inculcating selfish and abusive practices, he reasoned, 
communal lands prevented the development of a “love of property” that was the 
basis for any project of reclamation: “As long as the present mode of possession 
is conserved, the landes will consist of bleak deserts, dismal wastes, burning 
sands in the summer, swamps in the winter, a sick country all year round.”  If the 
most desolate and sterile regions of the Landes were to be fully integrated into 
the nation, one had little choice but to “destroy the system of communal property, 
                                                
23 Yves Luginbuhl, “Sauvage-cultivé: l'ordre social de l'harmonie des paysages,” in Du rural à 
l'environnement: la question de la nature aujourd'hui, eds. N. Mathieu and M. Jollivet (Paris: 
Harmattan, 1989), 42-49. 
24 Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier, “L’environnement vu par des notables locaux à la fin du XVIIIe 
siècle,” in Du Milieu à l’environnement: Pratiques et représentations du rapport homme-nature 
depuis la Renaissance, ed. Marie-Claire Robic  (Paris: Economica, 1992), 64-66. 
25 Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, “L’image des terres incultes: La lande, la friche, le marais,” in La Nature 
en Revolution, 1750-1800, ed. Andrée Corvol (Paris, 1993) 17.  
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the remains of barbaric times, which is opposed to the progress of industry of all 
kinds.”26  
Ponts-et-Chaussées engineers, the architects of the 1857 law, also 
harbored a deep suspicion of collective property.27 Their technocratic vision of a 
rationalized and unified national territory, in which circulatory networks of roads, 
canals and rails underpinned agricultural and commercial prosperity, had little 
room for local custom, which they viewed as an obstacle to the common good.28 
Henri Crouzet, the head of the Service hydraulique in the Landes that oversaw 
the application of the 1857 law, condemned the collective property regime as an 
“abusive and barbaric mode of possession” that had “forever condemned these 
vast spaces to infertility, solitude [and] unhealthiness…” 29  Privatization and 
forestation, he argued, would release the region from the chains of an arcane 
and inefficient system of land management and usher in a new era of progress.  
This “catastrophic writing” turned the Landes into a territorial blank slate of 
sorts.30 If nothing (of value) was there, everything was possible. The devaluing of 
local landscapes and practices justified all manners of conquest. Beginning in the 
mid-18th century, numerous companies, backed by urban capital from Bordeaux 
and Paris, attempted to establish agricultural colonies in the region.  Their high 
                                                
26 Baron d’Haussez, Études administratives sur les Landes, ou Collection de Mémoires et d'Écrits 
relatifs à la contrée renfermée entre la Garonne et l'Ardour (Bordeaux: Gassiot, 1826), 14-18. 
27 Antoine Picon,  L'Invention de l'ingénieur moderne: L'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, 1747-
1851 (Paris: Presses de l'Ecole nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 1992), 299-307. 
28 Theodore Porter, Trust in numbers: the pursuit of objectivity in science and public life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 124-5. 
29 AN F10 2338, Henri Crouzet, “Résumé des idées applicables à l’assainissement et à la 
colonisation des Landes du Golfe de Gascogne,” August 17, 1855. Established in 1846 as a 
special branch of the administration, the Service hydraulique was focused primarily on the 
extension of engineering expertise to the realm of agricultural production. Benjamin Nadault de 
Buffon, Conférences sur les irrigations, le drainage, le dessèchement des marais, la fixation des 
dunes et autres travaux analogues (Paris, 1850), 14-15. 
30 The phrase is borrowed from Cocula, “Le Landais au XIXe siècle,” 56. 
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tide came in the early 19th century, propelled by Legitimist aristocrats seeking a 
new source of economic security and social prestige following the Orleanist 
victory in 1830.31 Investment brochures overflowed with edenic descriptions of 
future abundance, from crops of rice, potato and colza to pine forests and 
teeming fisheries, all connected through a network of roads, canals and even 
railways that guaranteed a secure outlet in Bordeaux. 32 
If the Landes had become, by virtue of its marginality, a land of possibility, 
it remained a difficult adversary. Most of the ventures failed miserably. Blinded by 
visions of plenitude and profit, investors overlooked the basic challenges posed 
by the region’s geography. The poorly drained and isolated moors were no place 
for commercial agriculture. Companies regularly underestimated the costs of 
transportation, drainage, fertilizer and labor necessary to ensure a profitable 
return on their investments. Worse, land purchases frequently elided local claims 
of pasturage rights. Owners frequently found themselves contemplating not 
agricultural riches but collapsed drainage canals, burned plantations and 
uprooted crops.33 Still, the lure of the region remained.  
For the Second Empire state, the ruined Landes provided an ideal theater 
to demonstrate its modernizing prowess. Though it followed in the footsteps of 
earlier ventures, the law of 1857 diverged from their predominantly agricultural 
designs. Previous investors had failed largely because they had been unable to 
                                                
31 For the role of Legitimism in 19th century agricultural improvement schemes, see Steven Kale, 
Legitimism and the Reconstruction of French Society, 1852-1883 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State 
University Press, 1992). 
32 Osmin Ricau, “Notes sur les défrichements, assèchements, mises en culture des landes de 
Gascogne, avant le XIXe siècle,” Bulletin de la Société de Borda 101 (1976): 419-424. For an 
illuminating account of  these ambitious schemes around the Arcachon basin, see Alice Garner, A 
Shifting Shore, 16-30. 
33 Garner, A Shifting Shore; Louis Papy, Les Landes de Gascogne, 52. 
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calibrate their ambitions to local conditions. Engineers and officials concluded 
that in the unforgiving environment of the Landes the only profitable investment 
was the cultivation of pine forests. 34 
So it was that the pin maritime became an unlikely agent of civilization. In 
short, it offered a precise antidote to the ruined Landes. By privatizing the 
‘barbaric’ communal lands, forestation would teach local populations the benefits 
of careful management and rational exploitation, instilling the ‘love of property’ 
that Baron d’Haussez had found so lacking. A new market economy would 
develop through the export of resin and timber products, the revenues of which 
would not only enrich private landowners but swell communal coffers, funding 
schools, churches and roads. Finally, the pine forest would banish the unhealthy 
pall that hung over the Landes. The grid work of ditches overseen by state 
engineers would drain stagnant waters while the bracing perfume of resin would 
replace the noxious miasmas. The Landes would become a paragon of 
productivity and health. 35  
As state engineers and officials soon discovered, however, the 
transformation of the Landes required the support of local populations. While 
landowners quickly embraced the benefits of forestation, they did not always 
                                                
34 It should be noted that the French state was no stranger to the region. In the late 18th century, 
it had dispatched royal engineers from the Ponts-et-Chaussées administration to stabilize the 
encroaching Atlantic dunes through the plantation of pine forests. For the bitter and long-lasting 
property disputes that it spurred, see Bernard Saint-Jour, La Propriété des dunes du littoral 
gascon (Pau: Princi Negue, 2004). 
35 The properties of resin, one of the ‘good’ smells cataloged by Alain Corbin, were appreciated 
particularly along the Landais coast where a lively sanatorium industry had developed since the 
mid-19th century for treating tuberculosis patients. Alice Ingold, “Forêt et côte landaises au 
secours des tuberculeux,” in Les Landes: Thermalisme et forêt (Dax: Société de Borda, 1989), 
431-435; Alain Corbin, Le miasme et la jonquille : l’odorat et l’imaginaire social XVIIIe-XIXe 
siècles (Paris : Aubier Montaigne, 1982). 
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agree on how, and at what rate, it should proceed. In debates over land sales 
and plantation practices, they demonstrated a shrewd awareness of their power 
to shape the terms of modernization.  
La Forêt: Negotiating modernization 
 
Coupled with the forced sale of communal lands, the creation of drainage 
networks and the extension of roads and rails, pine forests became a powerful 
instrument of economic modernization that transformed local space and 
environment. Forestation effectively ‘fragmented’ the productive order and 
seasonal rhythms of agro-pastoral society which depended on the maintenance 
of and access to the communal landes. From its ruins, the forests forged a new 
social space, characterized by alienable private property and the ascendance of 
a new bourgeoisie.36 Yet the fate of the communal landes remained ambivalent. 
While a new spatial order coalesced around the creation and management of 
private pine forests, it was inflected by remnants of the communal past.37 
Affective attachments to the agro-pastoral landscape persisted, whether in the 
form of popular acts of resistance against forestation or as a tactic of 
appeasement and social legitimization among recently enriched landowners 
increasingly at odds with both state officials and rural society. This overlapping of 
the spaces of private forest and communal landes revealed the degree to which 
                                                
36 In this sense, the forested landscape represented the abstract and homogenous space  that 
Henri Lefebvre and others have attributed to the capitalist state. See Henri Lefebvre, La 
production de l'espace (Paris: Anthropos, 2000) and David Harvey, The Condition of 
Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 254-55 
37 For Lefebvre, the transformation of social space is a process of accretion and interpenetration 
rather than outright destruction: "No space ever disappears in the course of growth and 
development. The global does not abolish the local.” Lefebvre, La production de l'espace, 103 
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the transformation of the Landes remained a volatile and contingent affair, 
shaped by competing notions of property and belonging.  
The great irony of the modernizing forest was that its roots were local. 
While archaeological evidence of resin production suggests the presence of 
coastal forests in Roman times, the practices of drainage and forestation as a 
method of improving the interior landes date back to at least the 15th century.38 
Regions along the southwestern coast boasted relatively old pine forests that 
supplied timber for marine construction, as did certain wooded sections along the 
navigable waterways in the eastern cantons of Mont-de-Marsan and Roquefort. 
Even in the heart of the Grande Lande cadastral maps of the eighteenth and the 
early nineteenth centuries attest to the presence of forests, particularly along the 
natural drainage basins of the Petite and Grande Leyre. Geographers have 
estimated that as much as one-fifth of the region was forested by 1850.39  Most 
communes possessed small forested tracts known as  pignadars which 
supported the local production of pitch, resin, tar and turpentine destined for the 
ports of  Bordeaux and Bayonne.40  
The state appropriated this local practice of forestation but could not 
entirely control it. Within the very administration assigned to oversee the 
application of the 1857 law, there were significant differences over how 
                                                
38 J. Sargos, Histoire de la forêt landaise, 462. 
39 A. Pinaud, “L'occupation du sol dans la Grande Lande”, 305-314. 
40 Some communes, particularly in the northern regions of the Grande Lande where natural 
drainage was more pronounced and access to Bordeaux and the Garonne river easier, boasted a 
particularly high proportion of forest. According to a 1769 survey over half the lands in the parish 
of Saint-Symphorien were forested while the first cadastral survey of the commune in 1844 put 
the forest at 48%. R. Pijassou, “Structures foncières, société rurale et occupation du sol à Saint-




forestation should proceed.  Ponts-et-Chaussées engineers were fierce 
proponents of privatization and had scant regard for the communal property 
regime that supported traditional agro-pastoral society. However, in the two  
figures most closely associated with forestation, Jules Chambrelent and Henri 
Crouzet, one finds contrasting attitudes towards the role of local society in the 
transformation of the region.   
Few figures cast as long a shadow as Chambrelent in the Landais forest. 
In 1907, at the dedication of a monument raised in his honor at Pierreton, not far 
from Bordeaux, M. Muntz, a member of the Académie des Science, spoke of 
Chambrelent’s great legacy in the Landes:  
If we cast our minds back sixty years, this vast region appeared 
completely sterile, with a miserable and sparse population suffering from 
deplorable health conditions, amidst stunted [sheep] herds, swamps, and 
arid deserts….With the arrival of Chambrelent, a new era dawned on this 
deprived country. Today, we see it covered in beautiful forests whose 
products are destined for distant markets and inhabited by an industrious 
and robust population that has come to know comfort and health. This is 
the legacy of Chambrelent in the Landes.41  
 
Chambrelent had arrived in the region in 1841, as an ingénieur ordinaire 
stationed in Bordeaux. Ambitious, opportunistic, and well-connected, he moved 
easily in the new world of finance and investment that flourished under the 
Second Empire. Though he played only a marginal role in the application of the 
1857 law, which was overseen by the Service hydraulique, Chambrelent did 
much to popularize the image of the Landes as a wasteland in need of 
redemption. For Chambrelent, private capital and enlightened engineering were 
the twin engines that drove social and economic progress. In his ‘experiments’ of 
                                                




drainage and pine forestation at Saint-Alban, an estate he purchased near the 
outskirts of Bordeaux, Chambrelent demonstrated the potential riches that 
awaited intrepid investors in the Landes. At the 1855 Paris Exposition, he proudly 
displayed his specimens to a captivated audience.  He claimed that his ‘system’, 
consisting essentially of a grid work of drainage ditches and an early sowing of 
pine seedlings, would increase the value of unimproved  landes from 100 francs 
per hectare to upwards of 2000 francs for a minimal  investment of 55-70 francs 
per hectare.42 The desert of the Landes would soon bloom with thick forests. 
Chambrelent’s vision struck a chord among his Parisian admirers, who included 
Napoleon III and the novelist Edmond About, and before long he was touted (not 
least by himself) as the régénerateur des Landes.43   
While his more glamorous colleague championed the role of outside 
investors in the transformation of the Landes, Crouzet advocated that of the local 
landowner. Appointed the head of the Service hydraulique for the department of 
the Landes in 1853 and the director of the imperial estate of Solférino in 1856, 
Crouzet was a key figure in the region.44 In his dutiful reports throughout the 
                                                
42 AN F10 2339, Jules Chambrelent, “Rapport sur les travaux d’assainissement partiel et 
d’amélioration des Landes,” February 27, 1856; AN F10 2339, Chambrelent, “Des travaux 
d’ensemble à faire immédiatement et des mesures à prendre pour l’assainissement  et la Mise en 
Valeur des Landes de Gascogne,” September 30, 1856    
43 Sargos, Histoire de la forêt landaise, 364. Edmond About (1828-1885) had been so taken with 
Chambrelent after meeting him at the 1855 Exposition that he travelled to the region and visited 
his estate at Saint-Alban. His novel, Maître Pierre, which appeared in serial form in the Moniteur 
universal  in 1857 before the book was published in 1858, was a thinly-veiled celebration of the 
engineer’s claims of regeneration. In his dedication, he wrote how Chambrelent “ had parted 
before me the veils of the future [where] I saw a population of fifty thousand peasants saved by 
the genius of one man.”  Edward About, Maître Pierre (1858, rpt. Paris, 1997), xv. 
44 Unlike Saint-Alban, located close Bordeaux, Solférino was established in the midst of the 
Grande Lande, designed to be at once a testament to the paternalist enlightenment of the 
Emperor and a practical display of the techniques and benefits of regeneration. The estate, 
carved out of 7,000 hectares of land  purchased from seven neighboring communes 
(Labouheyre, Lüe, Commensacq, Escource, Sabres, Morcens and Onesse) along the new 
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1850s, one finds an enduring concern over the social effects of forestation. 
Crouzet urged his colleagues to draw on the lessons of local management, 
particularly in the western region of the Marensin where old stands of pine forest 
were interspersed with agriculture and pasturage. He envisioned a sort of 
Jeffersonian forest, where small wooded properties encircled modest farms and 
outlying crops and pasturage. These ‘agricultural oases’ would not only help 
populate the region with ‘pioneer families’ but also serve as natural firebreaks in 
the dense pine forests.45 
Tensions within the Ponts-et-Chaussées administration between 
economic and social visions of forestation resonated in local debates over land 
sales prior to the passage of the 1857 law. State officials and private speculators, 
particularly in the Gironde, supported the public sale of communal landes.46 They 
argued that a system of open bidding would provide a land market for eager 
investors emboldened by the improvements in transport and drainage in the 
region. At the same time, it would give a much-needed boost to communes, 
providing them with the necessary revenues to build a modern infrastructure of 
roads, schools, bridges and churches. In the future forests, profit and civilization 
walked hand in hand.   
                                                                                                                                            
Bordeaux-Bayonne rail, eventually formed the new commune of Solférino. Michelle Tastet, 
“Solférino, Domaine impérial: Une étude sur le peuplement,” Bulletin de la Société de Borda 461 
(2001): 179-190. 
45 Crouzet estimated that 220,000 hectares of forested commons would produce 3666 new farms, 
a figure amended only slightly by the parliamentary commission in charge of drafting the 1857 
law.  AN  F10 2339, “Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée d’examiner le projet de loi 
relatif à l’assainissement et à la mise en culture des Landes de Gascogne,”  May 19, 1857. 
46 The coup d’Etat of 1852 had brought the end of the Second Republic but also political stability, 
low interest rates and expanding credit institutions. In this new era of speculation, private capital 
became allied to state projects, particularly since domestic expenditures paled in comparison to 
those directed towards foreign policy and war. Girard, La politique des Travaux publics, 85-6; 
Jean-Luc Mayaud, “Le Second Empire: faîte économique ou épisode négligeable ?", 108. 
 
 84 
Many municipal authorities and local landowners objected to this market-
driven privatization, proposing instead a system of local concession proportionate 
to property ownership. In a widely circulated petition to the prefect of the Landes, 
the commune of Saugnac-et-Muret lobbied against public sale on the grounds 
that foreign investors would have little incentive to preserve the communal 
pasturage rights that much of rural society depended on. Drafted by Jean-
Baptiste Lescarret, a Bordelais lawyer and political economist as well as a 
prominent local landowner, the petition argued that local ownership of forests 
would prove the best custodian of communal pasturage. Since local landowners, 
unlike outside investors, had a vested interest in the maintenance of the agro-
pastoral economy, the petition reasoned that they would be more inclined to 
maintain access routes through, as well as limited pasturage in, their forested 
property. Privatization and forestation were the future but they need not, indeed 
could not, come at the expense of collective rights deeply rooted in both history 
and memory: "That the landes be drained and planted, this reason and progress 
dictate; but if this much-desired progress can be accomplished while respecting 
local rights…why reject a solution [local concession] so natural and just?" 47 
The contentious politics of land sales proved too much for legislators in 
Paris and in the final text of the 1857 law the matter was left to local authorities. 
During the first five years after the passage of the law, land sales generally 
followed two distinct patterns.48  In the department of the Landes local 
                                                
47 Jean-Baptiste Lescarret, Le dernier pasteur des Landes (1858, rpt. Pau, 1998), 148-150. 
48 Several meticulous studies of communal land sales have been undertaken by historians. See 
Jean-Pierre Lescarret, "La vente des landes communales de Saugnac-et-Muret et ses 
conséquences (1835-1883)," Bulletin de la Société de Borda 101 (1976): 425-450; R. Pijassou, “ 
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concession predominated. Lots, proportionate to either property tax or 
landholdings, tended to be small, between four and fifteen hectares, and sold at 
an average of forty to forty-five francs per hectare. 49 In the Gironde, in contrast, 
public sale was more frequent. The average lot tended to be bigger while the 
average price higher, around eighty francs per hectare. 50  
Differences in forestation in the two departments owed primarily to the 
relative availability of capital and transport. Speculators in and around Bordeaux, 
eager for large returns on their ample capital, tended to purchase larger tracts of 
land for both timber and resin production. In the Landes, local property owners, 
at a greater distance from commercial centers and far more modest in their 
available capital, were primarily concerned with ensuring low prices for smaller 
plots that would be devoted primarily to resin production. (Unlike timber products 
such as telegraph and mining posts, the market price of resin made up for high 
transportation costs.)51  
The outbreak of the American Civil War dramatically altered  the course of 
forestation. The federal naval blockade in 1861 cut off major resin producers in 
Virginia, Georgia, Florida and South Carolina from outside markets, leading to a 
steep rise in the global price of resin. In France, the market price of a barrique of 
resin soared, from sixty-five francs per barrel in 1860  to three hundred francs by 
                                                                                                                                            
Structures foncières, société rurale et occupation du sol à Saint-Symphorien”; and C. Bouchet,  
Lugos, commune des Landes de Gascogne. 
49 AN F10 2342, Prefect of Landes, “Rapport sur la situation des landes communales, 1860-
1861.”   
50 Archives départementales de la Gironde (hereafter ADG) 7M 641, report of  Service 
hydraulique chief engineer to prefect of Gironde, February 28, 1861. 
51 H. Cavaillès,  “Le problème de la circulation dans les Landes de Gascogne,” Annales du 
Géographie 240 1933: 574. 
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1864. 52  A wave of speculation broke over the Landes. With the boom in resin 
prices, local landowners soon abandoned themselves to intensive forestation 
while foreign investors swooped in. Reservations over public sale evaporated 
with the rapid inflation of land prices. Local concessions that had, on average, 
sold for 45 francs per hectare fetched upwards of 150 francs by the mid-1860s. 
Soaring land prices were a boon, it seemed, to communes. As one mayor 
remarked, it was as if they had discovered a “new Peruvian mine of riches.”53  
Most historians of the region agree that the widespread public sale of 
communal landes, spurred by the resin boom and encouraged by state officials, 
was the main culprit in over-forestation. In the words of one historian, this logic of 
speculation, facilitated by the state, constituted the “original sin” of the industrial 
pine forests.54 With few exceptions this narrative of corruption through 
speculation has structured historical approaches to the Landais forest, 
celebrating the local initiative of forestation while inoculating it against the social 
upheaval that ensued.55  
The notion that local landowners would be more inclined to maintain 
usage rights than outside investors was perhaps reasonable in theory but in 
practice few were willing to permit pasturage in or access through their 
plantations. Many failed to maintain access to the traditional sheep paths, known 
locally as péguilheyres, that served as corridors among prairies, moors and other 
                                                
52 A. Larroquette, Les Landes de Gascogne et la Forêt Landaise (Mont-de-Marsan: Imprimerie 
Dupeyron, 1924), 20. 
53 Quoted in  H. Faré, Enquête sur les incendies de forêts dans la région des Landes de 
Gascogne. (Paris, 1873), 137. 
54 Lescarret, Le dernier pasteur des Landes , 19. 
55 For a more critical stance towards local concession and more lenient view of the state, see 
Cailluyer, Regards sur l'histoire sociale des Landes. 
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pasturing areas, facilitating the seasonal patterns of transhumance. Félix 
Arnaudin, the celebrated poet, photographer and folklorist of the Landes, bitterly 
reflected in a journal entry how his father’s attempts to maintain a péguilheyre in 
Labouheyre had been undermined by a relative, Rémy Bacon, a “nouveau riche”  
notary who had benefited handsomely from the land sales around the imperial 
domain of Solférino. The “baconaille” had bought up all the surrounding lands for 
forestation.56  
Arguments for local concession veiled the despoliation of communal 
lands. Its proponents were mostly members of the rural elite, consisting of 
medium and large landowners and the cluster of neighboring bourgeoisie that 
included notaires, négociants, rentiers, professionals and small factory owners. A 
dominant influence on local municipal councils, they tended to invoke concession 
not because it was in the best interests of the community but  because it ensured 
them an advantage vis-à-vis outside investors in land purchases. 57 This is not to 
say that they were indifferent to the fate of communal pasturage. The agricultural 
system touched all members of rural society. Yet the rural elite were in a far 
better position than most locals to benefit from the privatization of communal 
landes. The real casualties of forestation were precisely those who had the most 
to lose from the elimination of communal pasturage: the small property owners, 
                                                
56 Félix Arnaudin, Oeuvres complètes, v. 8, Journal et choses de l'ancienne lande (Bordeaux: 
Parc naturel régional des Landes de Gascogne, 2003), 10. 
57 State officials had early on detected the self-serving motives of local concession. Local 
property owners, they suspected, were using the defense of communal rights as a way to 
increase their own holdings at discounted prices by shutting out non-local investors. Informed of 
the 1856 petition of Saugnac-et-Muret, the Minister of the Interior sharply replied that the 
municipal council “rejects public sale less in the name of any communal good than to procure for 
large property owners lands at a price not exceeding half their value.” Quoted in Lescarret, Le 
dernier pasteur des Landes, 15. 
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sharecroppers, agricultural laborers and pasteurs who made up the bulk of 
agropastoral society.  
Debates over the respective benefits of public sale and local concession 
reveal the fractured nature of modernization in the Landes. While fed by 
conflicting visions of forestation, they were less the result of any presumed 
dichotomy between state and local society than an effect of tensions within the 
project of modernization itself. Both sides, after all, sought a similar end: the 
privatization of communal landes. At issue was not whether forestation was the 
proper road to prosperity but how that prosperity should be apportioned.  
 
Le Feu: The shepherd’s revenge 
 
Whatever tensions existed within the rural world over forestation were 
muted during the first years following the application of the 1857 law. True, not all 
communes pursued the sale of communal landes with the same vigor and there 
were occasional reports of the destruction of recent plantations. 58 On the whole, 
however, the rural population appeared resigned to a forested future.  
This would change in the final years of the Second Empire, when the 
region was struck by economic and environmental disaster. First, the resin 
market, once buoyed by the blockades of American producers, crashed to earth. 
The price of a barrel of resin, which had risen as high as three hundred francs in 
                                                
58 Some communes proved more intransigent than others. One report in 1860 noted 32  
communes in the Landes (29% of the communes subjected to the 1857 law in the department) 
had failed to undertake part or all of the improvements required by the law. ADL 18S 1,  report of 
the ingénieur en chef to prefect of Landes, August 29, 1860.  
